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       The objective of this thesis is to determine whether the Strategic Systems Programs 
(SSP) should apply the concepts of Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) to 
Strategic Weapons Systems (SWS) Technical Engineering Support (TES) Services.  This 
thesis provides a Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Navy (DON), and 
SSP SWS program acquisition and PBSA history background, reviews overarching 
PBSA policy and the DON PBSA implementation plan, defines a working PBSA model, 
defines Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), details the SWS program 
structure, defines target SWS TES services, and reviews and analyzes SWS TES service 
contracts and associated PBSA implementation attempts.  The thesis concludes that the 
complete conversion of SWS TES services to PBSA is neither practicable nor desirable 
and recommends that SSP (1) establish a Government-only multi-functional PBSA team 
to perform a review of existing TES services statements of work to determine potential 
PBSA conversion tasking, (2) team with its business partners to develop a PBSA 
conversion business case, and (3) contract for selected SWS PBSA TES services through 
the use of a CPIF completion contracting approach with an aggressive share line and 
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Federal acquisition generally involves the purchase of construction, research and 
development, services, and supplies and equipment.  After the end of the Cold War and 
prior to the events of September 11, 2001 Federal acquisition declined significantly.  
During the 1990s Federal contract spending over the $25,000 small purchase threshold 
fell from a high of $232 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 1991 to a low of $188 billion in FY 
1999 before increasing to $204 billion in FY 2000 [Ref. 1: p. 3].  During the same period 
the predominant type of purchase shifted from supplies and equipment to services.  In FY 
1991 the percentages of dollars expended for supplies and equipment acquisition and 
service acquisition to overall acquisition were 44.4 percent and 33.6 percent, 
respectively.  In FY 1999 the percentages of dollars for supplies and equipment 
acquisition and service acquisition to overall acquisition were 35.1 percent and 42.6 
percent, respectively.  The Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest purchaser of 
services.  DoD was responsible for over $53 billion or 60 percent of all Federal services 
acquisition dollars expended in FY 2000 [Ref. 2: p. 3].  The growth in DoD services 
acquisition was largely driven by increases in information technology services and 
professional, administrative, and management support services [Ref. 2: p. 1].  In addition 
to the growth in service acquisition the General Accounting Office (GAO) has routinely 
provided testimony before the United States House of Representatives and Senate 
concluding that the Government is mismanaging service contracts [Refs. 3 and 4].   
In light of these circumstances service acquisition policy related to Federal 
acquisition in general and DoD in particular has been revised to encourage the use of 
performance-based contracting approaches in the hopes of achieving efficiencies and 
resulting cost savings.  Chapter II will provide comprehensive insight into the 
implementing Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) policies.  A review of the 
specific policy changes (1) reinforces that the Government considers the acquisition of 
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commercially available services a key and growing component of its overall mission, (2) 
demonstrates that the Government has gone through a philosophical shift in service 
acquisition strategy towards PBSA, and (3) establishes that the Government will 
aggressively focus on ensuring that the principles of PBSA be implemented to the 
maximum extent practicable.  It should be noted that different policies and guides 
referenced throughout this thesis use the terms “Performance-Based Service Contracting 
(PBSC)” and “PBSA”.  The Researcher uses the cited terms to maintain the integrity of 
the each reference.  However, the terms are considered interchangeable and the 
Researcher will use the term “PBSA” for general discussion purposes.  
During FY 2002 the Department of the Navy (DON) was responsible for more 
aggregate contract award dollars than any other individual DoD component as illustrated 




DoD FY 2002 Contract Awards 
(Source: From http://www.abm.rda.hq.navy.mil/presentation.cfm, 6 May 2003, slide 6) 
 
In FY 2002 DON was responsible for $47.7B or 27.9 percent of all DoD contract 
award dollars compared to $47.6B or 27.8 percent for the Air Force, $46.1B or 26.9 
percent for the Army, $14.6B or 8.5% for the Defense Logistics Agency, and $15.1B or 
3 
8.8% for all other defense agencies.  Figure 2 illustrates DON’s acquisition structure that 
includes a centralized management and policy group that steers Departmental execution 
philosophy and resulting priorities and multiple buying Commands that possess the 
delegated authority to manage and execute varying missions.  
 
NAVAIR NAVSEA SPAWAR MSC







DON Acquisition Structure (Source: Developed by Researcher) 
 
To date DON has achieved some experience and success in implementing PBSA 
on services including: non-technical “blue collar” support; operation and maintenance of 
facilities; administrative and clerical support; computer maintenance and test range 
support; transportation, travel and relocation services; medical services; telephone call 
center operations; training; software maintenance and support; environmental 
remediation; software development; management support; studies and analyses; and 
surveys [Ref. 5: Appendix 4].  Table 1 below provides DON-wide PBSA metric 
information for FY 2002 including the number of service actions, number of PBSA 
actions, percentage of PBSA actions to overall service actions, service dollars, PBSA 




FY 2002 DON PBSA Service Metrics 
 
(Source: From ASN Provided Metric Information (DD350 Basis) dated 8 April 2003) 
 
Overall the data indicates that during FY 2002 14.8% of all DON service related 
actions and 18.68% of all DON service related dollars were acquired through the use of 
PBSA.  In addition there is a wide range of performance among the System Commands 
with PBSA action data ranging from 5.21% to 37.67% of all service actions and PBSA 
dollar data ranging from 6.1% to 48.01% of all service dollars.  A potentially large target 
area of opportunity exists if a method of PBSA application can be developed for 
Technical Engineering Support (TES) services.  Chapter III will provide a comprehensive 
definition of TES services.  Generally, TES services are more complex and costlier to 
contract than those services detailed above.  Since TES services are expensive to the 























       
MSC 1,789 213 11.91 $1,043,602,661 $501,068,676 48.01 
NAVSUP 12,550 4,727 37.67 $3,341,649,441 $1,352,355,773 40.47 
MARCOR 566 65 11.48 $92,488,740 $25,680,839 27.77 
HQMC 772 225 29.15 $421,823,782 $107,927,258 25.59 
SSP 176 55 31.25 $546,377,002 $135,144,143 24.73 
NAVAIR 5,515 1,128 20.45 $2,608,189,426 $551,126,665 21.13 
ONR 485 44 9.07 $83,107,709 $10,076,080 12.12 
NAVSEA 17,239 1,418 8.23 $4,041,995,681 $317,082,350 7.84 
NAVFAC 60,156 7,344 12.21 $5,143,772,966 $395,708,196 7.69 
SPAWAR 5,509 287 5.21 $1,274,052,870 $77,689,720 6.10 
       
TOTAL 104,757 15,506 14.80 $18,597,060,278 $3,473,859,700 18.68 
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meaningful savings to the Government.  Conclusions and recommendations developed 
within this thesis will discuss the practicality of applying PBSA on TES services and lay 
the foundation for development of a practical model. 
 
2. Strategic Weapon System (SWS) Program 
 
On 2 December 1955 Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), established the Navy’s Special Projects Office, now Strategic Systems Programs 
(SSP) [Ref. 6].  SSP’s mission was to design, develop, and deploy a submarine-launched 
nuclear deterrent in response to the USSR’s development of space launch capability.  
Rear Admiral (RADM) William Raborn was appointed as its first Director and was 
provided virtually unlimited authority and resources to fulfill the mission, as supported 
by the following passage from the declassified “top secret” memorandum from Admiral 
Burke to RADMs Clark (OP-51) and Raborn.   
 
If RADM Raborn runs into any difficulty with which I can help, I will 
want to know about it at once along with his recommended course of 
action for me to take.  If more money is needed, we will get it.  If he needs 
more people, those people will be ordered in.  If there is anything that 
slows this project up beyond the capacity of the Navy Department we will 
immediately take it to the highest level and not work our way up through 
several days. 
 
With such a mandate RADM Raborn was able to attract a cadre of public and 
private sector experts and big business to form a partnership aimed at accomplishing 
something that had never been done before in as soon a time as possible.  The foundation 
of the initial missile program (POLARIS A1) was performance specifications including 
accuracy, availability, and launch reliability specifications.  The first POLARIS flight test 
occurred in September 1958 and on 20 July 1960 the first POLARIS A1 missile was 
launched from the USS George Washington.  This was an astonishing technical 
achievement and remains a testament to what can be achieved via Government/Industry 
teamwork and readily available resources.  Subsequently, the SWS program evolved 
through five successor missile developments and deployments including the POLARIS 
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A2 and A3, POSEIDEN C3, TRIDENT I (C4), and TRIDENT II (D5) missile programs 
and was a major contributor to the ending of the Cold War. 
The end of the Cold War significantly impacted the SWS program’s mission, 
standing, and budget.  Although a submarine-launched nuclear deterrent continues to be a 
mainstay of U.S. national security there is no foreseeable plan to develop a next 
generation missile and associated delivery systems including launcher, guidance, fire 
control, and navigation subsystems.  The current D5 Backfit production (conversion of 
four C4 configured submarines to D5 capability) has a low production rate, has been 
subjected to political cuts, and will at best maintain existing production capabilities 
through FY 06.  As production efforts draw down the SWS program’s industry partners 
will need to diversify to maintain current labor forces.  Consequently, the primary 
function of SSP and its industry partners will be to maintain and support existing systems 
through an efficient fleet support and repair and replenishment program.   
SSP’s challenge is to continue to provide high quality support to Fleet Ballistic 
Missile (FBM) customers in an environment of program mission uncertainty, 
significantly reduced budgets, and the associated reprioritization of industry partners.  
PBSA may offer SSP an opportunity to leverage off its proven strengths in performance- 
based hardware contracting and long-term business relationships to effectively meet these 
challenges. 
 
3. SWS Technical Engineering Support (TES) Services PBSA 
Implementation Experience 
 
The SWS program was founded and has been executed upon the concept of sole-
source, long-term business relationships with a family of contractors including, at its 
core, DoD giants such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General 
Dynamics.  These relationships have fostered an environment of Government/Industry 
teamwork; shared technical, program, and cost risk; and a higher than average profit 
margin for participating Contractors due to the inclusion of performance and schedule 
incentives including accuracy, availability, launch reliability, logistics effectiveness, 
quality, and delivery into SWS subsystem production contracts.  The Government has 
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benefited from this arrangement by receiving timely delivery and impressive hardware 
performance.     
Since 1997 SSP has attempted to incorporate PBSA into its TES services 
contracts.  Early attempts were generally unsuccessful but efforts have evolved over time 
to a point where some limited success has occurred.  A quick glimpse of historical 
program execution reveals a decided disincentive for SWS Contractors and Government 
Program Managers (PMs) to incur the additional performance and contract risk 
associated with PBSA.  Historically, SWS production efforts have been performed under 
Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) or Cost-Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) type contracts to 
accommodate FAR cost incentive mandates when providing performance incentives to 
Government contracts.  The mandate is well grounded in that a performance-based 
contract without cost limits would likely incentivize contractors to expend vast amounts 
of money to obtain incremental performance improvements.  On the other hand, TES 
services have been historically performed under a Cost-Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) Level-of 
Effort (LOE) contract type.  This contract type allows maximum flexibility to expend 
resources on the correction of emerging problems that best serve the fleet and maintain 
the performance parameters of the SWS subsystems.  The overarching contracting 
strategy is founded on the premise that deployed systems have been fielded at high 
performance levels, the SWS fleet is highly trained and conditioned to rely on those 
performance levels, and the CPFF LOE TES services contracts provide a flexible contract 
mechanism for the fleet, program management, and Contractors.  Under this philosophy 
Contractors can leverage their production contracts, where the profit margin is relatively 
high, off of the TES services contracts, which have historically provided a large reserve 
of funding to trouble-shoot and correct fleet problems.  The SWS fleet and program 
management benefit because responses to problems are generally quick and 
comprehensive. 
PBSA implementation experience to date has resulted in problems on both the 
Government and Contractor ends of the acquisition.  The parties have struggled with 
establishing a meaningful Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) that can define 
activities critical to mission success and measure an Engineer’s response to varying 
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complexities of problems.  With a declining budget and a resulting increasing Trouble 
Failure Report (TFR) backlog SSP needs the contractual flexibility to prioritize a 
Contractor’s work on important problems.  Under a PBSA without a realistic PMB the 
Contractor is incentivized to meet delivery milestones by occasionally trading-off 
complex for simple issues.  In this environment neither party has been willing to 
undertake the significant administrative time necessary to develop a new approach due to 
the old adage “if it’s not broke don’t fix it”.  In any event there is no known TES services 
PBSA data supporting that conversion to a PBSA would save the Government money and 




The scope of this thesis will be to investigate PBSA and the feasibility of 
application to SWS TES services.  The Researcher will draw a series of conclusions 
concerning PBSA policy, TES services elements in which the application of PBSA may 
provide Government savings and efficiencies, and successes and failures of PBSA 
application on the target SWS TES services arena.   Drawing upon these conclusions the 
Researcher will provide recommendations for highest probability of success 
implementation methodologies and further investigation.  The primary and secondary 
research questions that will be addressed include the following: 
 
1. Primary Research Question 
 
a. Should the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Apply the 
Concepts of PBSA to Strategic Weapons Systems (SWS) 
Technical Engineering Support (TES) Services? 
 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
 
a. What Is PBSA and What Are the Overarching Department of 




b. What Are Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) TES 
Services?  
 
c. What Has Been SSP’s Experience With TES Services PBSA 
Acquisition Strategies?  
 
d. What Are the Significant Factors That Have Facilitated or 
Hindered SWS TES Services PBSA Implementation? 
 
e. How Might SSP Apply PBSA Best Practices and Risk Mitigation 




The Researcher will perform the thesis research in close alignment with the 
research questions defined above with the objective of identifying TES services elements 
most favorable to PBSA application and suggested implementation methodology.   The 
thesis will be structured to discuss the following three general subsections: (1).PBSA 
policy foundation, DON implementation, and PBSA model definition; (2) MDAP and 
SWS TES services definition; and (3) SSP TES services PBSA implementation and 
acquisition strategy experience.  The following methodologies will be used to develop 
each of the three subsections: 
 
1. Subsection (1) will include a review of (a) Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR), Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), and Navy 
Acquisition Procedures Supplement (NAPS) regulation; (b) Federal, DoD, and Navy 
implementing policy; (c) and various PBSA implementing guidance handbooks.  
2. Subsection (2) will include the (a) definition and identification of MDAP 
programs through various internet reference materials, (b) review of the Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework contained within the new DoD 5000.2 instruction 
approved on 12 May 2003, and (c) definition of core SWS TES services elements 
through the review of TRIDENT missile, guidance, navigation, launcher, fire control, and 
test instrumentation subsystem contracts and associated contract files.   
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3. Subsection (3) will include (a) the review of contract files associated with 
TES services PBSA attempts within the SWS TRIDENT missile, guidance, navigation, 
launcher, fire control, and test instrumentation subsystems and (b) interviews with 
Government and Contractor personnel involved with each TES services PBSA attempt. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter I has introduced the thesis background, scope, and methodology.  The 
Government considers the acquisition of commercially available services a key and 
growing component of its overall mission and has undergone a philosophical shift in 
service acquisition strategy towards PBSA.  Background research has established that the 
DoD is the largest acquisition component within the federal budget and the DON is 
DoD’s largest acquisition component.  The DON is comprised of ten buying Commands 
that provide facilities, research activity, supplies, and services in support of the fleet.  
Overall FY 2002 DON PBSA metric data indicates that 14.8% of all DON service related 
actions and 18.68% of all DON service related dollars were acquired through the use of 
PBSA.  In addition there is a wide range of performance among the System Commands 
with PBSA action data ranging from 5.21% to 37.67% of all service actions and PBSA 
dollar data ranging from 6.1% to 48.01% of all service dollars.   
SSP is one of DON’s buying Commands and provides our nation’s submarine-
launched nuclear deterrent, the SWS TRIDENT D5 Missile and associated delivery 
subsystems.  SSP has delivered impressive hardware performance as a result of long-term 
business relationships with industry partners and implementation of relevant performance 
incentives.  Limited attempts have been made to transfer successful hardware incentive 
experience to TES services with minimal success.  This thesis will define PBSA and 
MDAP TES services, review SSP PBSA implementation experience, and identify TES 
services elements most favorable to PBSA application and suggested implementation 
methodology.  Chapter II provides a PBSA policy foundation, the DON implementation 
plan, and PBSA model definition. 
  
11 
II. PBSA POLICY FOUNDATION, DON IMPLEMENTATION, 
AND PBSA MODEL DEFINITION 
 
A. PBSA POLICY FOUNDATION 
 
The Service Contract Act of 1965 established the Government’s service contract 
labor standards.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under OMB Circular A-
76 dated 4 August 1983 established the Government’s policy to (1) achieve economy and 
enhance productivity through Government/Commercial competition of activity whenever 
permissible, (2) retain Governmental functions in-house, and (3) rely on available 
commercial sources to provide commercial products and services [Ref. 7].  Overarching 
legislation including the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, The Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 have 
emphasized that the Government must better manage its internal and acquisition 
processes by establishing performance requirements, accurately measuring performance, 
and rewarding and penalizing good and bad performance, respectively. 
Much of the historical foundation of performance-based requirements is rooted in 
hardware development and deployment.  The Navy’s submarine launched ballistic 
missile and NASA’s space programs are stunning examples of performance-based 
achievement.  Since Government acquisition has gradually shifted to service acquisition 
it clearly makes good business sense for the Government to apply performance-based 
concepts to service requirements in an attempt to increase service delivery efficiency.  
The Government has reinforced this performance-based philosophy through a series of 
services specific policies and regulations.  The Office of Federal Procurement and Policy 
(OFPP) under Policy Letter (P.L.) 91-2 dated 9 April 1991 provided a definition of 
performance-based contracting and established the Government’s service contracting 
policy [Ref. 8].  Performance-based contracting was defined as “structuring all aspects of 
an acquisition around the purpose of the work to be performed as opposed to either the 
manner by which the work is to be performed or broad and imprecise statements of 
Work.”  Government Acquisition managers were directed to (1) use performance-based 
contracting methods to the maximum extent practicable when acquiring services; (2) 
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select acquisition and contract administration strategies, methods, and techniques that 
best accommodate the requirements; and (3) justify the use of other than performance-
based contracting methods when acquiring services.   
The Federal Acquisition Circular (FAC) 97-01 dated 22 August 1997 
implemented OFPP P.L. 91-2 through the amendment of Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) Parts 7, 16, 37, 42, 46, and 52 [Ref. 9].  The most critical aspect of the FAC 97-01 
amendment was the establishment of FAR Subpart 37.6, Performance-Based Contracting 
[Ref. 10].  In addition to guidance on the Statement of Work, Quality Assurance, 
Selection Procedures, Contract Type, and Follow-on and Repetitive Requirements 
aspects of PBSA, FAR Subpart 37.6 set forth general requirements as follows: 
 
Performance-based contracts-    
(a) Describe the requirements in terms of results required rather than 
the methods of performance of the work;  
(b) Use measurable performance standards (i.e., terms of quality, 
timeliness, quantity, etc.) and quality assurance surveillance plans 
(see 46.103(a) and 46.401(a));  
(c) Specify procedures for reductions of fee or for reductions to the 
price of a fixed-price contract when services are not performed or 
do not meet contract requirements (see 46.407); and  
(d) Include performance incentives where appropriate. 
 
Section 821 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 
106-398, directed a FAR revision to establish a preference for Performance-Based 
Service Contracting [Ref. 11].  Section 821 also required specific reporting on 
implementation results, establishment of Centers of Excellence, and enhanced training in 
service contracting.  OMB Memorandum M-01-15 dated 9 March 2001 established that 
the FY 2002 PBS Contracting (C) goal was to award contracts over $25,000 using PBSC 
techniques for not less than 20 percent of the total eligible service contracting dollars 
[Ref. 12].   FAC 97-25 dated 2 May 2001 implemented Section 821 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398 by amending FAR 
Subpart 37.102, Service Contracting Policy, to state that performance-based contracting 
is the preferred method for acquiring services [Ref. 13].   
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Specific DoD implementation objectives and timeframes were introduced on 5 
April 2000 when the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology issued 
a PBSA memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military departments Directors, Defense 
Agencies Director, and Defense Logistics Agency establishing that, at a minimum, 50 
percent of service acquisitions, measured both in dollars and actions, are to be 
performance-based by the year 2005 [Ref. 14].  DoD Departments were additionally 
directed to (1) develop implementation plans within their organizations not later than 60 
days from the date of the memorandum and (2) ensure that relevant workforce take PBSA 
training within 12 months from the date of the memorandum.  On 2 January 2002 the 
Under Secretary of Defense promulgated Section 821 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398 to the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments Directors, Defense Agencies [Ref. 15]. 
 
B. DON IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The DON submitted its response to DoD PBSA direction on 11 July 2000 [Ref. 
16].  The submittal contained a PBSA endorsement memorandum for distribution to 
DON acquisition leadership and the DON implementation plan [Ref. 17].  The PBSA 
endorsement memorandum disseminated the implementation plan and highlighted the 
following key components: (1) an announcement that electronic tools are available on 
http://www.rda.hq.navy.mil, (2) identification of target PBSA business areas, (3) a 
request for PBSA training plan for personnel participating in service acquisition not later 
than 30 October 2000, and (4) a requirement that Heads of Contracting Activities (HCAs) 
must provide information on PBSA accomplishment within 30 days after the end of the 
fiscal year.    
The implementation plan provided specific information to assist the contracting 
activity in interpreting and executing the PBSA requirement.  The implementation plan 
stipulated that (1) a DON contract can be categorized as PBSA if at least 80% of its 
dollar value met the criteria of FAR 37.6 to be categorized as PBSA, (2) standard 
commercial services may be considered PBSA, and (3) the plan applied to service 
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requirements exceeding the DD 350 reporting threshold of $25,000.   The implementation 
plan identified the following service contract categories to which PBSA will apply:  
 
1. Maintenance, overhaul, repair, service, rehabilitation, salvage, 
modernization or modification of supplies, systems or equipment; 
2. Maintenance of real property; 
3. Base operations and support contracts; 
4. Operation of Government-owned equipment, facilities and systems; 
5. Education and training; 
6. Medical services; 
7. Program management support; and 
8. Research and Development (less basic and applied research) 
 
Three key overarching elements were emphasized including (1) a statement that 
ASN(RDA) is the focal point for implementing PBSA with DON and will issue PBSA 
guidance and criteria to all functional areas of the DON acquisition community; (2) 
identification of an outreach program which provided informational websites and training 
opportunities, and (3) plans for developing a DON service contracting summit.  HCAs 
were requested to provide PBSA metrics to assess DON effectiveness in implementing 
PBSA.  Figure 3 provides the required format for HCA metric information. 
 
Figure 3 
Required HCA PBSA Metric Information 
(Source: From DON Implementation Plan dated 11 July 200) 
DON Performance Based Services Acquisition 
PBSA Contract Awards 
Command: Period: 
Business Area: Total Estimated Dollars Total Number of Actions 
Total Service Contract Awards   
PBSA Contract Awards   
PBSA Compliance Rate   
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Specific milestones were established which included the following key 
components: (1) Implementation Plan to USD(ATL) by 30 June 2000, (2) ASN(RD&A) 
memorandum to Program Executive Officers (PEOs)/Direct Reporting Program 
Managers (DRPMs)/HCAs by 30 June 2000, (3) Links to NCMA/NAPM and SAF/AQC 
web-based PBSA training by 10 July 2000, (4) Review and update additional links 
(continuous), (5) RDA Knowledge Management: Updates to promote PBSA acceptance 
(continuous), (6) PBSA Performance Reports by 30 October 2000 and annually through 
2005, (7) PBSA Training Plans by 30 October 2000, and (8) RDA/ABM Services 
Contracting Summit by 1st Quarter 2001. 
Finally, ASN(RD&A) notified HCAs/PEOs/DRPMs in Memorandum dated 8 
May 2002 [Ref. 18] of the provisions of Section 821 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, P.L. 106-398 and required activities to record 
answers to the following questions on qualified PBSA activity: (1) Was competition 
increased?, (2) Did a Non-traditional Contractor participate?, (3) Did a Non-traditional 
Contractor get the award?, (4) Did use of authority save time? If yes, estimated PALT 
reduction., and (5) Did use of authority result in cost savings? If yes, estimated cost 
savings.  A Non-traditional Contractor means a commercial contractor who would not 
have otherwise proposed.     
 
C. PBSA MODEL DEFINITION 
 
Several PBSA guides have been issued since the Government adopted PBSA as 
the preferred method for service contracting.  The three publications referenced here are 
(1) “A Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service Contracting” issued by 
OFPP in October 1998 [Ref. 5]; (2) “Guidebook for Performance-Based Services 
Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department of Defense (DOD)” issued by the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology in December 2000 [Ref. 19]; and 
(3) “Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services Acquisition” (web-based) issued in 
January 2002 by a team comprised of members from the Departments of Commerce, 
Defense, Agriculture, and Treasury, the General Services Administration, and 
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Acquisition Solutions (Contractor) [Ref. 20].  A thorough review of these guides reveals 
that they are each based on a generally consistent PBSA model while the latest guide 
provides the most comprehensive PBSA implementation guidance.  Figure 4 illustrates 
the PBSA Model reflecting a consolidation and condensation of the OFPP, DoD, and 



























PBSA Model (Source: Developed by Researcher) 




¾ Program/Project Manager 
¾ Contracting Officer  
¾ QA Manager 
¾ Legal Advisor 
¾ Financial Manager 
¾ Small Business Rep.  




Conduct Market Research 
 
¾ Sources sought requests 
through FedBizOps 
¾ Industry Conferences 
¾ Requests for Information 
¾ Industry Networking 
¾ Telephone, Email, and 
personal interviews  
 
(3) 
PBSA Requirements Generation 
 
¾ Performance Work Statement 
 Job Analysis 
 Performance Objectives 
 Performance Standards 
 Acceptable Quality Levels  
 Performance Requirements Summary 
or 
¾ Statement of Objectives 
 High-level Acquisition Objectives 
¾ Quality Assurance Plan 
 Quality 
 Quantity 
 Timeliness  
(4) 
Source Selection  
 
¾ Per FAR 15 
 Synopsis 
 Justification and Approval/ 
Source Selection Plan 
 Requests for Proposal 
 Proposal Submittal 
 Proposal Evaluation  





¾ Service Delivery 
 Surveillance 
 Contract Administration 
 Conflict Resolution 
 Measure Performance 
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The key components of PBSA include the establishment of a PBSA team, market 
research, PBSA requirements generation, source selection, and contract management.  
The development of a successful PBSA effort requires significant teamwork and 
coordination within Government and between Government and industry.  The 
overarching objective is to increase service delivery efficiency by providing service 
providers the flexibility to manage their operations in a manner that most effectively 
meets the Government’s objectives while maximizing its profit potential.  The natural 
offshoot of such an arrangement would be a long-term, quality-focused, business 
relationship that controls acquisition costs.   
 
1. PBSA Team 
 
The Seven Steps and DoD guides provide that establishment of a multi-
disciplinary team is an important first step in a successful PBSA effort.  The Seven Steps 
guide emphasizes team formation and performance processes.  The PBSA effort can only 
succeed if it has the full support and cooperation of senior management either as 
facilitators or actual members.  The team should have a charter that defines the project’s 
objectives and the roles and responsibilities of each member.  Team members should be 
trained to understand that team dynamics will play an integral role in product 
development.  Standard management theory suggests that teams progress through five 
distinct stages including forming, storming, norming, performing, and adjourning [Ref. 
21: pgs. 232-236].  To be effective the team should be required to retain its membership 
to the maximum extent practicable through the PBSA performance period, empowered to 
investigate and solve problems that will develop during PBSA development and 
performance, and rewarded for success.  
The DoD guide recommends that the team be comprised of Government, industry, 
and customer/end-user personnel.  Suggested functional area representation includes 
program/project managers, contracting officers/specialists/administrators, quality 
assurance managers, legal advisors, financial managers, small business managers, and 
cost/price analysts.  The amount and type of industry representation is dependent upon 
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acquisition method.  Under a sole source procurement effort industry representatives will 
be consistent and continuous members of the team throughout the PBSA life cycle.  
Under a competitive scenario representatives of all interested Offerors may be involved 
in the development of the Request for Proposal (RFP) through such processes as draft 
RFPs and bidder’s conferences but only the successful Offeror will be a post award 
participant. 
 
2. Market Research  
 
FAR Part 10 establishes the importance of market research for all Government 
programs [Ref. 22].  Market research can be simply defined as the gathering and analysis 
of information pertinent to the market in which any given acquisition will take place and 
is a concept that generally applies to all private and public acquisition.  Extensive market 
research is essential for developing and executing a PBSA contract.  Since market 
research addresses business and technical considerations of a requirement, successful 
assessment requires the participation of all PBSA team members.  Market research 
should be conducted before any documents are developed to obtain information about 
alternative solutions that may be available from the marketplace.  The team should 
consider both Private-sector and Public-sector solutions to the required services.  A 
variety of approaches may be used including issuing “sources sought requests” in 
FedBizOps.gov, conducting an industry conference, issuing Requests for Information 
(RFIs), attending industry conferences, and networking through industry points of contact 
for required expertise.  In essence, any approach that results in obtaining information of 
value is acceptable.  Since market conditions are continuously evolving, market research 
and surveillance should also be periodically conducted after contract award to ensure that 
the existing PBSA contract vehicle remains effective in motivating the Contractor to 
perform the desired outcome. 
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3. PBSA Requirements Generation 
 
The DoD PBSA guide focuses on the Performance Work Statement (PWS) 
approach to requirements generation.  The Seven Steps PBSA guide details both the PWS 
 and Statement of Objectives (SOO) requirements generation methodologies.    
 
a. Performance Work Statement (PWS) Approach 
 
The PWS approach includes job analysis and the development of a 
Performance Requirements Summary (PRS) and PWS.  
(1) Job Analysis.  Job analysis involves determining what the 
agency’s needs are, and what kinds of services and outputs are to be provided by the 
Contractor.  The end objective of job analysis is to link the planned acquisition to the 
agency’s mission and performance objectives.  Key elements of job analysis include 
organization analysis, work analysis, performance analysis, directives analysis, data 
gathering, cost analysis, and incentive analysis.   
 Organization analysis involves reviewing the agency’s needs and identifying 
the services and outputs required from the Contractor.  It should emphasize the outputs 
the Contractor will produce, but should not dictate how to produce these elements.   
 Work analysis involves further analyzing the required outputs by breaking 
down the work into its lowest task level and linking tasks in a logical flow of activities.  
This task should start with identifying the overall service or output required from the 
Contractor, then break down all parts and subparts, and conclude by establishing 
relationships between all identified elements. 
 Performance analysis involves assigning a performance element to each task.  
This is accomplished by developing a performance standard level required by the 
Government and establishing an Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) for each task.  An 
AQL sets the allowable error rate or variation from the standard. 
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 Directives analysis involves the review of relevant agency directives to 
determine which should be utilized during performance of the contract.  In general, 
imposed directives should be held to a minimum since excessive application could 
undermine the effectiveness of a PBSA philosophy. 
 Data gathering involves the development of an estimate of the workload to be 
performed, through the use of historical data or best estimate, and the items and services 
that the Government will furnish to the Contractor for performance of the contract.  Such 
data is instrumental in providing the Contractor a meaningful picture of what is required 
so that they can provide realistic cost estimates to perform the requirement.   
 Cost Analysis involves development of a cost estimate for each service or 
output through the use of internal historical data or commercial pricing techniques.  The 
estimates are then used as the basis for development of a Government Cost Estimate, 
proposal evaluation, and the determination of positive and negative performance 
incentives.   
 Incentives analysis involves determining the appropriateness of applying 
incentives to induce better quality performance.  Incentives may be positive, negative, or 
a combination of both and should only be applied to the most important aspects of the 
required work.  An important consideration in establishing meaningful incentives is that 
they should be challenging but achievable.  Easily achieved incentives do not motivate 
innovation or efficiency. Difficult to achieve incentives may result in cost overruns as the 
Contractor expends resources to try to earn the incentive or dissuade the Contractor from 
even attempting to accomplish the desired performance. 
(2)  Performance Requirements Summary (PRS).  The PBSA PRS 
details the performance objectives, performance standards, AQLs, and other related key 
information as desired.  The PRS should be brief and clear as it will become the baseline 
for the PWS.  It is common that the PRS is formatted in a table or matrix that allows easy 



















     
     
     
     
     
 
Figure 5 
Example PRS Format 
(Source: From Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the 
Department of Defense (DOD)) 
   
 (3)  Performance Work Statement (PWS).  The PWS is the 
translation of the results of market research and job analysis into a written document that 
states the required services in terms of outputs, measurable performance standards for the 
desired output, and an AQL for each desired output.  Writers should use the PRS as a 
reference document and describe the requirements in accordance with FAR guidelines.  
An effectively written PWS will provide enough flexibility for bidders to propose 
alternative approaches to best solve the Government’s objectives.  A poorly written PWS 
will generally result in bidders providing the same solution to the Government’s 
objectives.  The PWS should be a stand-alone document with minimal reference to 
regulatory or other guidance. 
 
 b. Statement of Objectives (SOO) Approach 
 
The SOO is a short document that provides the basic, high-level objectives 
of the acquisition and is provided in the solicitation in lieu of a Government written PWS.  
The SOO approach requires competing Contractors to develop, and submit within their 
proposals, the statement of work, performance metrics, measurement plan, and Quality 
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Assurance Plan (QAP).  The Seven Steps guide outlines several elements that should be 
considered in SOO development including (1) an initial statement of how the acquisition 
relates to the agency’s program or mission need and what problem needs solving, (2) a 
short description of the work scope and funding constraints (if desired), (3) a high-level 
performance objective, (4) assurance that the acquisition objectives reflect agency 
strategic planning to stimulate a partnership environment with the Contractor, (4) a clear 
and concise identification of performance constraints, and (5) acquisition background and 
environment.  
  
c. Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) 
 
The QAP defines what must be done to ensure that the contractor has 
performed in accordance with the PWS performance standards.  In a PWS requirements 
generation approach the Government provides the QAP in its solicitation.  QAPs  are 
proposed by the Contractors when using an SOO requirements generation approach. The 
QAP should be developed based on the premise that the Contractor rather than the 
Government is responsible for managing and ensuring that quality controls meet the 
terms of the contract.  The QAP is an evolving document that describes how the 
Government personnel will evaluate and assess Contractor performance.  The QAP 
should outline the acceptance process and should state how acceptance of services will 
occur.  The detail in the QAP should be commensurate with the importance of the task 
and focus on the quality, quantity, and timeliness of the performance outputs.  
Development of the QAP allows the Government to clearly define the amount of contract 
administration resources needed.  It should also be coordinated with the Contractor 
Quality Control Plan to ensure that duplicate administrative effort does not occur.  The 
QAP should contain a surveillance schedule and clearly state the surveillance methods to 
be used.  Common assessment methods include 100% inspection, random sampling, 
periodic sampling, trend analysis, customer feedback, and third-party audits. 
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d. Source Selection 
 
FAR Parts 14 [Ref. 23] and 15 [Ref. 24] provide detailed prescriptions for 
the sealed bidding and contracting by negotiation acquisition processes, respectively.  
This thesis focuses on the contracting by negotiation process since a best value selection 
is preferred for subject matter services.  The general processes involved within 
contracting by negotiation include issuance of a synopsis, Justification & Approval 
(J&A) or Source Selection Plan (SSP) development, development and release of a RFP, 
proposal development and submittal, proposal evaluation, best value selection, and 
award.  Each PBSA requirement should be reviewed to determine which contract type is 
most likely to motivate the Contractor to perform.  The preferred contract types are fixed-
price and incentive.  However, cost-reimbursement contracts are allowable when services 
can only be defined in general terms or definitive service requirements and/or scope is 
not completely known at the onset.   
The choice of PBSA requirements generation approach may significantly 
affect the timing and complexity of RFP development, proposal development, and 
proposal evaluation.  The RFP will contain the PWS or SOO and, if required, a QAP, as 
well as other standard elements including applicable clauses and source selection criteria.  
An RFP with a PWS will take more time to develop and is more complex than a SOO 
based RFP because the Government develops and establishes a detailed requirement.  
The Contractor’s proposal process in response to a RFP with a SOO will require more 
effort than a PWS based RFP because the Contractor will be developing the statement of 
work, performance measures and metrics, surveillance methods, and QAP.  Proposal 
evaluation must follow guidelines established in the Source Selection Plan and RFP 
regardless of the type of requirement.  However, evaluation of a SOO based acquisition 
will likely take longer and be more complex because Contractors are encouraged do 
develop their best solution to satisfy the Government’s requirement(s).  Evaluations that 
compare a number of different approaches are generally more complicated than 
evaluations of similar approaches. 
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e.   Contract Performance 
 
PBSA contract performance consists of general efforts including service 
delivery, surveillance, contract administration, conflict resolution, and performance 
measurement.  The chance of performance confusion and conflict may be greatly reduced 
in each of these efforts if (1) the PBSA team thoroughly considers all contract 
performance issues when developing the PSW, SOO, and RFP and during proposal 
evaluation and (2) a post-award orientation is conducted to ensure that the Contractor and 
Government completely understand their roles in the contract arrangement.  A brief 
synopsis of each effort is provided below. 
(1)  Service Delivery.  The Contractor should provide service in 
the quantity and quality specified within the resulting PBSA contract.  The provided 
service may include direct and indirect labor and could include such functional areas as 
“touch” labor, program management, financial management, quality management, 
contract management, and resource management.   
(2)  Surveillance.  Surveillance must be performed as stated in the 
QAP during the performance period.  A good QAP includes a surveillance schedule and 
clearly states the surveillance method to be used.  The amount of surveillance effort of 
Government and Contractor personnel are clearly dependent upon Past Performance 
Information (PPI) and the QA method used, i.e. 100% inspection, periodic inspection or 
insight obtained via Process Oriented Contract Administration Services (PROCAS).  A 
good surveillance process provides confidence within the business relationship that the 
proper service is being provided and that a mechanism is in place for problem detection 
and resolution.   
(3)  Contract Administration.  Contract administration involves a 
wide variety of activities that the Government and Contractor perform to ensure that the 
contractual requirements are met.  PBSA contracts should have streamlined activity as a 
result of shifting the performance focus from processes to outputs.  Nevertheless, the 
PBSA team must structure an administrative plan that considers the nature and 
complexity of the service and the type of contract. 
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(4)  Conflict Resolution.  Contract performance can be 
significantly impacted when the parties resolve disputes through the claim and litigation 
processes.  The PBSA team should establish a mutual understanding of potential sources 
of conflict and ways to resolve any problems that may arise during contract performance.  
Common approaches to managing conflict include (1) establishing a partnership 
agreement that provides remedies for problems that arise, (2) assigning an ombudsman to 
investigate selected complaints and recommend corrective actions, and (3) alternate 
disputes resolution.   
(5)  Performance Measurement.  Performance measurement is a 
key ingredient to a successful PBSA.  During PBSA development the PBSA team must 
consider what and how information will be collected to definitively assess how service is 
provided.  In his article entitled “The Measure of Success, Performance Metrics Deserve 
Careful Consideration” (Contract Management, December 1999) Mark Martens 
presented some basic principles for successful Performance Metrics (PMs) [Ref. 25].  A 
review of a support services contract awarded to multiple Contractors at different 
locations revealed inadequate PMs had been developed that subsequently invalidated the 
performance measurement system as a useful tool in measuring Contractor performance.  
The article recommended that successful PMs should: 
  
 define what’s important to the organization at a high level; 
 relate to a result rather than a process; 
 result in objective, specific, and quantifiable definitions; 
 be location-neutral and fair for comparison to other sites or benchmarks; 
 be sufficiently standard so as to be contractor-neutral and fair for 
comparison; 
 include only results that are clearly under the control of the Contractor; 
 lead toward comprehensive and comparable standards; 
 encompass all aspects of desired performance; 
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 define mutually exclusive indicators so that a Contractor will not be 
rewarded, or penalized, twice for the same performance, unless it is 
desirable to emphasize a particular measure; 
 be recorded over time to establish a historical baseline; and 
 identify all variables that will be needed to calculate the PMs 
 
Good PMs allow the Government to evaluate the Contractor’s 
success in meeting contract requirements and provide Contractors with timely and 
meaningful feedback. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter II has set forth the PBSA policy foundation, DON implementation 
approach, and PBSA model definition as supported by various implementation guides 
and the FAR.  PBSA policy foundation supports that the Government is focused on 
improving the efficiency of service acquisitions through the use of PBSA.  The DON has 
complied with Federal and DoD policies and has developed a responsive and detailed 
implementation plan.  A PBSA model was presented that reflected the use of the FAR 
and three PBSA guidance publications including (1) “A Guide to Best Practices for 
Performance-Based Service Contracting” issued by OFPP in October 1998; (2) 
“Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department of 
Defense (DOD)” issued by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology in December 2000; and (3) “Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services 
Acquisition” (web-based) issued in January 2002 by a team comprised of members from 
the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, and Treasury, the General Services 
Administration, and Acquisition Solutions (Contractor). 
Chapter III will define Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) TES 
services through reviews of (a) various internet reference materials, (b) DoD interim 
defense acquisition guidebook dated 30 September 2002, and (c) TRIDENT missile, 
launcher, navigation, and guidance subsystem contracts and associated contract files. 
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III. MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAM AND 
STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS TECHNICAL 
ENGINEERING SUPPORT SERVICES DEFINITION 
 
A. MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS (MDAPs) 
 
1. DoD Acquisition Program Establishment 
 
DoD acquisition programs are established as a result of detailed threat assessment 
and requirements generation processes set forth in OMB Circular A-109 [Ref. 26] and the 
Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 [Ref. 27].  Formative requirements 
generation documents include the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military 
Strategy (NMS), Mission Area Analysis (MAA), Mission Need Statement (MNS), 
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) [Ref. 
28].   
The NSS describes the U.S. strategy for world leadership, foreign policy, 
diplomacy, promotion of democracy, open economic markets, and deterrence.  The NMS 
defines the environment, missions, objectives, and priorities supporting the NSS.  The 
MAA establishes a mission need through the identification of deficiencies or 
opportunities in support of the NSS and NMS.  The MNS documents the mission need 
without regard to any particular material solution.  The AOA identifies cost effective 
material alternatives to satisfy the MNS and, upon alternative selection, lays the 
foundation for development of an ORD.  The ORD specifies the required system 
capabilities and characteristics and establishes minimum acceptable operational values 
for broad performance parameters.  Performance specifications and baselines are then 
generated to translate the ORD into a Request for Proposal (RFP) and resulting contract. 
The requirements generation system initiates the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS) and Acquisition Management (AM) decision support systems.  
The PPBS is the process used by the legislative and executive branches to authorize and 
appropriate funding for selected programs.  Upon receipt of funding the combat 
developer then uses the AM system to acquire the operational requirement.  
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2. DoD Acquisition Categories 
  
 DoD acquisition programs are categorized by Acquisition Category (ACAT) 
designation including ACATs I (various), II, III, and IV [Ref. 29].  The ACAT 
designation of a program determines the level of oversight for key milestones within the 
program’s development, production, testing and deployment.  Major systems receive 
ACATs I (various) and II designations.  ACAT I programs are further defined as Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), designated as ID or IC, or Major Automated 
Information Systems Acquisition Programs (MAISAPs), designated as IAM or IAC.  
MDAPs are designated by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).  A program is considered an MDAP if its projected 
development effort exceeds $365 million or its projected procurement effort exceeds 
$2.19 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars.  High dollar and politically sensitive programs 
typically begin as ACAT ID programs and become ACAT IC after a period of time.  As 
of December 2002 the Navy has ten ACAT ID and sixteen ACAT IC MDAPs.   
 A MDAP is designated ACAT ID when the program has other special interests 
such as technical complexity and Congressional interest.  An ACAT ID designation 
establishes the USD(AT&L) as the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and is reviewed 
by the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).  An MDA has the ultimate authority to make a 
wide range of milestone decisions for a program.  The DAB supports milestone decisions 
and is chaired by the USD(AT&L); vice-chaired by the Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff; and includes the USD(Comptroller), USD(Policy), USD(Personnel & Readiness), 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD)(Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence (C3I))/DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO), Director of Operational Test 
and Evaluation (DOT&E), and the component Secretaries as members.  Current DON 
ACAT ID programs include the following [Ref. 30: p. 2]: 
 
 AAAV - Advance Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
 CEC - Cooperative Engagement Capability 
 CVN(X) - Next Generation Nuclear Aircraft Carrier 
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 DD(X) - Future Surface Combatant Program 
 LPD 17 - Amphibious Assault Ship 
 SSGN - TRIDENT Conversion 
 SSN 774 - VIRGINIA CLASS Submarine 
 T-AKE - LEWIS AND CLARK CLASS of Auxiliary Dry Cargo Ships 
 4BW/4BN - USMC Mid-life Upgrade to AH-1W Attack Helicopter and 
UH-1N Utility Helicopter 
 V-22 - OSPREY Joint Advance Vertical Lift Aircraft 
 
 All other MDAPs are categorized as ACAT IC.  An ACAT IC designation 
establishes the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) as the MDA and is reviewed by 
a Component-level Review Board.  The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for 
Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) has been designated the Navy 
Acquisition Executive (NAE) for DON ACAT IC programs.  SECNAVINST 5420.188E, 
ACAT Program Decision Process, outlines the internal DON program review process.  In 
general, ASN(RD&A) has the flexibility to delegate decision authority and ensures that 
Program Decision Principal Advisors (PDPAs) are invited to attend key decision point 
meetings.  Current DON ACAT IC programs include the following [Ref. 30: p.2]: 
 
 AESA - Active Electronically Scanned Array Program  
 AGM-88E AARGM - AGM-88E Advance Anti-Radiation Guided Missile 
(AARGM) Program 
 AIM-9X - Air-to-Air Missile Upgrade 
 CVN 68 - NIMITZ CLASS Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers 
 DDG 51 - Guided Missile Destroyer which includes basic ship and all 
variants  
 E-2C REPRODUCTION - HAWKEYE Carrier-Based Early Warning 
Aircraft 
 F/A-18E/F - HORNET Naval Strike Fighter 
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 JSOW BASELINE/BLU-108/UNITARY - Joint Stand-Off Weapon with 
Baseline Variant, BLU-108 submunition, Unitary Warhead variants 
 LHD 1 - Amphibious Assault Ship 
 MH-60R - Multi-Mission Helicopter Upgrade 
 MH-60S - Utility helicopter to replace existing CH-46D, HH-60H, SH-3 
& UH-1N helicopters 
 MIDS0LVT – Multi-Functional Information Distribution System-Low 
Volume Terminal 
 SM 2 (BLOCKS I/II/II/IV) – Standard Surface-to-Air Missile 2 
 T-45TS – Undergraduate Jet Pilot Training System 
 TACTICAL TOMAHAWK – Follow-on to TOMAHAWK Baseline 
missile program 
 TRIDENT II MISSILE – Sea Launched Ballistic Missile 
 
SSP’s SWS TRIDENT II (D5) Missile program transitioned to an ACAT IC 
designation during the 1990s after initial production quantities had been delivered and the 
technological baseline was established.  The program was downgraded despite the fact 
that it still attracts significant Navy budget with a projected $12.7B of U.S. appropriation 
from FY 03 through FY 08 [Ref. 31: p. 12].  However, SSP is significantly involved in 
the currently classified ACAT 1D conversion of decommissioned SSBN TRIDENT 
submarines to the SSGN configuration.    
 
3. MDAP Acquisition Cycle and Associated Engineering Services 
 
On 12 May 2003 the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and 
Logistics) (USD(AT&L)), Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, 
Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD(C³I)), and Director, Operational Test and 
Evaluation (DOT&E) approved the new DoD 5000.2 establishing the “Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework”, illustrated below as Figure 6.  The new DoD 
5000.2 establishes a simplified and flexible management framework for translating 
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mission needs and technology opportunities, based on approved mission needs and 
requirements, into stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs that include 




The Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
(Source: From Department of Defense Instruction Number 5000.2)   
 
The new Defense Acquisition Management Framework details an overarching 
program acquisition cycle that includes three milestone decision points (A, B, and C) and 
five distinct progression phases including Concept Refinement (CR), Technology 
Development (TD), System Development & Demonstration (SDD), Production & 
Deployment (PD), and Operations & Support (OS).  It should be noted that Milestone 
decisions do not occur at the beginning of the CR phase and between Initial Operational 
Capability (IOC) and Final Operational Capability (FOC).  A discussion of the Defense 
Acquisition Management Framework Implementation process is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  However, it is important in defining the target TES services of this thesis to 
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a. Concept Refinement (CR) & Technology Development (TD) 
Engineering Services 
 
Specific engineering service effort within the CR and TD phases involve 
concept generation and feasibility studies generally performed by members of the 
scientific community that may include various engineering disciplines.  The CR and TD 
phases are normally funded with Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
appropriation.  Maximum contracting flexibility is required during CR and TD due to 
each effort’s significant unpredictability and to allow for the free flow of ideas and 
analysis.  At this stage of the Government/Contractor relationship the Government 
generally absorbs a larger portion of contract and performance risk by establishing Cost 
Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) Level of Effort (LOE) or CPFF Completion contract types.  
Analysis of the programmatic, budgetary, and contractual conditions within the CR and 
TD phases suggest that the conversion of associated engineering services into a PBSA 
arrangement would be a significant challenge and would likely be unsuccessful since the 
nature of the effort is highly unpredictable and development of a performance 
measurement baseline would be considerably subjective. 
 
b.  System Development & Demonstration (SDD) Engineering 
Services  
 
Specific engineering service effort within the SDD phase involves the 
conversion of scientific concepts into a practical engineering model, design, and 
prototype.  Important system performance, design, and cost trade-offs occur during the 
SDD phase.  RDT&E appropriation is normally the funding source during the early 
stages of the SDD phase.  As the design characteristics become more stable the funding 
source may transition to the procurement accounts including Weapons Procurement 
(WP), Other Procurement (OP), and Ship Construction (Navy Only) (SCN) 
appropriations.  Maximum contracting flexibility is still required within the SDD phase 
although the effort reflects a transition from the purely scientific to the engineering 
development arena.  At this stage of the Government/Contractor relationship the 
Government still generally absorbs a larger portion of contract and performance risk by 
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establishing CPFF LOE or CPFF Completion contract types.  In some instances a Cost 
Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type with or without specific performance incentives 
(i.e. accuracy of a weapons system) is used in an attempt to control cost and motivate the 
Contractor to achieve required system performance levels.  Analysis of the 
programmatic, budgetary, and contractual conditions within the SDD phase suggests that 
the conversion of associated engineering services into a PBSA arrangement would be 
difficult because the effort remains highly unpredictable and development of a 
performance measurement baseline would still be considerably subjective. 
 
c. Production & Deployment (PD) Engineering Services 
 
Specific engineering service effort within the PD phase involves the 
conversion of a system design and prototype into a producible and testable system.  
Normal funding sources during the PD phase include the WP, OP, and SCN accounts and 
may include Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriation.  At this stage of the 
Government/Contractor relationship the Contractor should accept a larger portion of 
contract and performance risk through the establishment of CPIF or Fixed Price Incentive 
(FPI) contract types with refined performance incentives attached to critical system 
performance characteristics.  Although adequate Contractor performance data should be 
available by the PD phase to support the implementation of performance-based hardware 
acquisition a PBSA arrangement would pose some difficulties in establishing an 
agreeable performance measurement baseline.  Historical engineering services data 
collected during the SDD phase could not reasonably be used to project PD phase 
engineering services effort because the nature of the efforts in the two phases are 
substantially different.  Engineering services within the SDD phase predominantly 
involve senior-level engineers and costlier engineering disciplines including hardware 
and software design, systems, and software engineers whose primary objective is to 
develop, test, and build a low quantity of systems that can meet the mission need.  Early 
stage PD phase effort focuses on the producibility, quality assurance, reliability, and 
maintainability of the developed system and requires a different skill mix involving 
leaner (more junior personnel) and less costly (on average) engineering disciplines 
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including electrical, manufacturing, and industrial engineering.  Later stage PD 
engineering service effort may provide an opportunity for PBSA since metric information 
collected during early stage effort can be used to establish acceptable performance and 
quality standards. 
 
d. Operations & Support (OS) Engineering Services 
 
Specific engineering service effort within the OS phase relates to the 
operational sustainment and upgrade of deployed systems.  The predominant funding 
source for OS operational sustainment effort is O&M.  OS upgrade efforts may be funded 
with WP, OP, SCN, and O&M,N appropriations.  At this stage of the 
Government/Contractor relationship the Contractor normally accepts a significant portion 
of the contract and performance risk through the establishment of FPI and Firm-Fixed 
Price (FFP) contract types with performance incentives attached to firm system 
performance targets.  MDAPs remain in the OS phase until system disposal.  By this 
stage of a MDAP the Contractor has collected substantial system and labor force 
performance data that can be relied upon to adequately project target performance levels 
and establish a realistic performance measurement baseline.  The engineering labor mix 
within the OS phase should generally align with engineering services actuals incurred 
during the PD phase for early OS phase efforts.  A more correlative engineering labor 
mix exists between early stage OS phase actuals and later stage OS phase efforts.   
The objective of this thesis is to explore the application of PBSA on 
MDAP engineering services within the OS phase.  The Researcher considers this target 
engineering service area to have a relatively high probability for successful conversion 
into a PBSA arrangement compared to other stated Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework phases.  In addition, a recent GAO report to the Subcommittee on Readiness 
and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate presented the 
following finding: 
 
Traditionally, development and procurement have accounted for about 28 
percent of a weapon’s total ownership cost, while costs to operate, 
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maintain, and dispose of the weapon system account for about 72 percent 
of the total. For a number of years, the department’s goal has been to 
spend less on supporting systems and to devote more funds to 
development and procurement in order to modernize weapon systems. 
But, in fact, growth in operating and support costs has limited the 
department’s buying power. [Ref. 32: p. 4] 
 
This GAO finding makes it clear that the largest element of a weapon’s 
total ownership cost is OS and that the DoD must focus on developing processes that 
contribute to reducing operations, maintenance, and disposal costs to free up funding for 
the development of new weapons systems.  Successful application of PBSA principles 
during engineering services efforts occurring within the OS phase may be one process 
that can help control an MDAP’s total ownership cost.   
   
B. STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEM (SWS) PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND 
TECHNICAL ENGINEERING SUPPORT (TES) SERVICES DEFINITION 
 
1. SWS Subsystem Structure and Planned Funding Profile 
 
  Key hardware elements of the SWS include the missile, guidance, launcher, fire 
control, navigation, and test instrumentation subsystems.  The SWS is a fully deployed 
system residing in the OS phase of the Defense Acquisition Management Framework.  
Table 2 provides the aggregate FY 04 through FY 08 SWS planned funding profile by 
appropriation for each major subsystem in then year $M.   
 
Table 2 















Missile 352.0 2848.9 14.6 1105.8 6.0 4327.3 
Guidance 235.5 746.1 0.0 701.2 0.0 1682.8 
Navigation 5.7 0.0 138.3 360.2 0.0 504.2 
Launcher 64.1 0.0 109.7 261.4 55.8 491.0 
Fire Cont. 0.0 0.0 130.7 109.6 22.8 263.1 
Test Inst. 0.0 0.0 18.7 117.8 8.4 144.9 
Total 657.3 3595.0 412.0 2656.0 93.0 7413.3 





  Relatively minor production efforts and system modification efforts, including D5 
Backfit and Life Extension, remain active and are funded with WPN, OPN, and SCN 
procurement accounts.  The predominant missile and guidance subsystem funding 
account is WPN because SSP is still in production of “fly away” hardware and each 
subsystem includes minimum annual production quantities in order to maintain 
production capability.  The O&M,N appropriation accounts for nearly 36 percent of the 
planned aggregate FY 04 through FY 08 SWS funding.  The missile and guidance 
subsystems account for 68% of the overall O&M,N funded effort.  The predominant 
funding appropriation for all other subsystems is O&M,N.  The funding profile 
demonstrates that a significant portion of the planned aggregate effort from FY 04 
through FY 08 relates to operational support.  
 
2. SWS Organizational and Program Management Structure  
 
The SWS program was conceived and has been executed within a framework of 
long-term, sole-source Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) teams and 
Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) involving several geographically dispersed large 
defense Contractors and SSP field activities.  Lockheed Martin supports the (1) missile 
subsystem through its Space Systems Company (LMSSC) division of Sunnyvale, CA and 
(2) navigation subsystem through its Naval Electronics and Surveillance Systems 
(LMNE&SS) division of Mitchel Field, NY.  General Dynamics Advanced Information 
Systems (GDAIS) of Pittsfield, MA supports the fire control and launcher subsystems.  
Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL), a non-profit organization, of Boston, MA 
supports the Guidance Subsystem.  Northrop Grumman Marine Systems (NGMS) 
supports the launcher subsystem.  The Boeing Company (Boeing) of Anaheim, CA 
supports the navigation subsystem.  L3/Interstate Electronics Corporation (IEC) supports 
the test instrumentation subsystem.  Myriad other companies support the SWS program 
but this thesis focuses on engineering services contained within annual support contracts 
awarded to those companies specified above.  
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The organizational structure of SSP headquarters located in Washington, D.C. 
includes (1) individual, semi-autonomous SSP technical branches managing the missile 
and test instrumentation subsystems, missile reentry program, fire control and guidance 
subsystems, launcher subsystem, and navigation subsystem and (2) staff function 
branches including contracting, legal, budget and accounting, computer services, security, 
administrative services, training, and weapons system integration.  The technical 
branches report to the Technical Director.  The budget and accounting, computer 
services, administrative services, and training branches report to the Plans and Programs 
Director.  The weapons system integration branch functions as the weapons system prime 
integrator and reports to the Chief Engineer. The Technical Director, Plans and Programs 
Director, Chief Engineer, Head of Contracts, and General Counsel are direct reports to 
the Director of SSP (DIRSSP).  Each technical branch contains a system sustainment and 
production group and is responsible for the execution of dedicated budgets that vary in 
size and mission.   
Much of SSP’s program involvement takes place via program management 
offices (PMO) located at each of the companies detailed above; the Strategic Weapons 
Facility Atlantic (SWFLANT) located in Kings Bay, GA; the Strategic Weapons Facility 
Pacific (SWFPAC) located in Bangor, WA; and the Naval Ordnance Test Unit (NOTU) 
located at Cape Canaveral, FL.  The co-located PMOs provide DIRSSP with intricate 
knowledge of operations and performance at each of the prime contractors and serve as 
an extension of program authority and control.  SWFLANT coordinates the final missile 
assembly, missile handling, and submarine on/off-load requirements for Atlantic fleet 
TRIDENT submarines and is cohabited with prime contractor personnel.  SWFPAC 
coordinates the final missile assembly, missile handling, and submarine on/off-load 
requirements for Pacific fleet TRIDENT submarines and is also cohabited with prime 
contractor personnel.  NOTU provides test and general supply services to the TRIDENT 
submarine fleet.  
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3.      SWS Technical Engineering Support (TES) Services 
 
SSP negotiates and awards each major SWS subsystem Contractor an annual 
contract for sustaining TES services [Refs.33-38: p. various].  The overarching mission 
of each Contractor is to maintain existing performance standards relating to SWS 
accuracy, availability, launch reliability, logistics effectiveness, and parts obsolescence 
and Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) management.  Each subsystem has its own 
unique set of performance parameters that contribute to the overall SWS performance 
targets.  In this respect, performance degradation in any of the subsystems could cause 
overall SWS performance problems.  The consolidated listing of TES services defined 
below stems from a detailed review of the Statements of Work (SOWs) of each 
subsystem contract.  It should be noted that contracting methodologies for each 
Contractor differ since a separate SSP technical branch manages each subsystem.  Some 
contracts contain detailed specifications on how to perform sustaining TES services while 
others set forth broad objectives.  However, regardless of the contract structure the 
cultural relationship between the Contractor and SSP program management and 
engineering functions is to provide required support at the required time as determined by 
jointly developed task prioritization.  If an urgent need arises the parties require the 
contractual flexibility to reprioritize the planned tasking to meet the need.  Therefore, the 
standard contract type is CPIF/CPFF LOE.  The breadth of engineering disciplines 
involved in supporting these efforts include design, systems, software, electrical, 
manufacturing, mechanical, industrial, materials, component, test, field, quality, and 
logistics engineers.   
A consolidated description of TES services effort resulting from an independent 
contract and reference document review of each subsystem includes the following 29 
tasks: 
 
(1) Accuracy Evaluation and Maintenance Support  
(2) Analysis and Evaluations of Patrol Data 
(3) Computer Resources Support 
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(4) Configuration Management Support 
(5) Contract Data Management Support 
(6) Follow-on Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Evaluation Test (FCET) and 
Demonstration and Shakedown Operations (DASO) Support 
(7) Fleet Documentation Support 
(8) Life Cycle Management Support 
(9) Logistics Support 
(10) Maintainability and Maintenance Support 
(11) Obsolescence Management Support 
(12) On/Off-Site Field Engineering Support 
(13) Performance Evaluation Support 
(14) Problem Identification, Investigation, and Solution 
(15) Program Management Support 
(16) Quality Assurance and Surveillance Support 
(17) Reliability Support 
(18) Repairs Support 
(19) Safety Program Support 
(20) Software Development and Maintenance Support 
(21) Strategic Programs Alteration (SPALT) Technical Assistance 
(22) Subsystem-unique equipment support 
(23) SWFLANT and SWFPAC Support 
(24) Systems Evaluations and Design Technical Assistance 
(25) Support Planning Assistance 
(26) Test Equipment Support 
(27) Test Facility Operation and Maintenance  
(28) Trouble Failure Report (TFR) Analysis and Corrective Action Reports 
(CARs) Support 
(29) Training Support 
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Each of these general categories of TES support is further decomposed within 
each subsystem contract.  An illustration of this decomposition is the following 
Navigation subsystem support planning assistance sub-tasking [Ref. 35: p. 32]: 
 
(1) identify resource requirements for potential future program changes; 
(2) develop, control, and report program requirements and allocations;  
(3) coordinate, monitor, and expedite response to Navy communications;  
(4) develop and support program reviews and meetings; and  
(5) develop specifications, statements of work, presentations, reports and                    
proposals arising from support planning activities.   
 
The Contractor’s proposal for the support planning assistance task provides 
further visibility into each subtask’s level of effort, associated deliverables and 
delivery schedule, supporting material and travel requirements, and proposed 
engineering labor mix. 
Detailed differences between the levels and types of support for each TES 
support category exist between Contractors and subsystems as demonstrated by the 
following performance evaluation support category comparison.  Performance 
evaluation generally involves the collection and analysis of SWS performance data.  
However, subsystem efforts differ as follows: (1) Missile performance evaluation 
support focuses on the missile-unique efforts of propulsion system data acquisition 
and evaluation, missile body and test equipment evaluation, and transit 
accident/incident performance; (2) Guidance performance evaluation support focuses 
heavily on the accuracy of the missile as measured through missile flight-testing; (3) 
Navigation performance evaluation support focuses on submarine global positioning 
accuracy; (4) Launcher performance evaluation support focuses on launch reliability 
and effectiveness; (5) Fire Control performance evaluation support focuses on fire 
control responsiveness and availability, and (6) Test Instrumentation performance 
evaluation focuses on the operational support of missile flight tests. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter III has defined Major Defense Acquisition Programs by detailing how 
DoD Acquisition Programs are established and categorized.  The Defense Acquisition 
Management Framework acquisition cycle and engineering services within each 
phase of the Defense Acquisition Management Framework were identified and 
discussed.  The chapter then delineated the SWS program through a review of the 
SWS subsystem structure, planned funding profile, and SSP organizational and 
program management structures.  Finally, a consolidated listing of TES service 
efforts of the various SWS subsystems was provided and discussed.  Chapter IV will 
provide a chronological history of SSP’s attempts to convert TES services to PBSA 
arrangements and will analyze the strengths and weaknesses of those attempts and 
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IV. SWS TES SERVICES CONTRACTS AND PBSA 
IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
 
A. SWS TES SERVICES CONTRACTS 
 
The general contracting philosophy within the SWS program has evolved from 
the annual execution of multiple contracts ranging in size and complexity supporting each 
SWS subsystem to an annually or semi-annually executed large dollar and complex 
omnibus contract supporting each SWS subsystem.  Consequently, the contracting and 
program personnel responsible for each SWS subsystem typically execute and manage 
individual, large dollar contracts that contain multiple Contract Line Item Numbers 
(CLINS), contract types, and contract incentives.  In addition, since each SWS subsystem 
is to a large extent managed independently, specific contract deliverables, language, and 
approaches differ.  Table 3 provides a comparison of the six primary SWS subsystem 
omnibus contracts to illustrate SWS subsystem contracting differences. 
Table 3 
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(Source: Developed by Researcher) 
44 
The consolidation of efforts under such omnibus contracts has both positive and 
negative affects on procurement lead times, contract administration, and contract and 
program execution and management.  A single contract reduces the number of new 
procurement actions, Contractor bid and proposal costs, Government procurement 
administration activity, and Contractor contract management while providing both the 
Government and Contractor additional resource management flexibility.  However, the 
execution and administrative processing times associated with omnibus contracts are 
longer and the tasking more complex than simpler contracts.  
Each SWS omnibus contract includes TES Services either as a separate CLIN or 
as a separate task within a CLIN.  In addition, four of the six contracts contain TES 
Services associated cost and performance incentives at varying levels of sophistication as 
detailed in Table 4. 
Table 4 
SWS TES Incentive Comparison 
Contract  N00030-02-C-0100 N00030-02-C-0021 N00030-03-C-0005 N00030-03-C-0008 
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(Source: Developed by Researcher) 
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 The SWS missile subsystem performance incentive approach can be described as 
overarching while the SWS navigation, launcher, and fire control subsystems incorporate 
both overarching and targeted performance incentives approaches.  An overarching 
performance incentive can be defined as an incentive that is associated with key hardware 
performance parameters but is applied against TES services.  Examples of overarching 
performance incentives include missile subsystem reliability, navigation subsystem 
accuracy, launcher subsystem launcher/missile system performance, and fire control 
subsystem effectiveness.  The general philosophy behind the overarching performance 
incentive approach is that the existing levels of performance associated with the 
TRIDENT missile and its delivery systems can’t be sustained without excellent TES 
services delivery.  Intuitively then as long as hardware performance is sustained the TES 
service delivery is excellent and the Contractor has earned maximum incentive.  The 
Contractor loses portions of the available performance incentives if the system 
performance level drops and may even be assessed a negative incentive if the system 
performance drops to unacceptable levels.   
In contrast a targeted performance incentive can be defined as an incentive that is 
associated with a particular TES services element.  Examples of targeted performance 
incentives include navigation subsystem logistics effectiveness, launcher subsystem D5 
Interactive Electronic Test Manual (IETM) development, and fire control subsystem 
TFR/CAR turnaround time.  The general philosophy behind the targeted performance 
incentive approach is to incentivize specific important TES service elements that directly 
affect the overall system performance.  To illustrate this point the navigation subsystem 
logistics effectiveness TES service element is a key contributor to overall navigation 
subsystem performance elements.  High levels of logistics effectiveness can lead to high 
levels of system performance while logistics effectiveness degradation can result in 
deteriorating system performance.  A TES service element can be designated important 
as a result of experienced performance problems or because of the magnitude of its 
contribution to system level performance. 
Another relevant contract factor to consider is the maximum positive and negative 
performance incentive amounts associated with each TES services related CLIN.  It 
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should be noted that, with the exception of the SWS missile subsystem, Table 3 
performance incentives are paid from Accounting Classification Reference Numbers 
(ACRNs) specifically assigned to the TES services CLIN.  The SWS missile subsystem 
performance incentive payments are allocated to ACRNs contained in the hardware 
production and TES services CLINs with 68.4 percent of each earned incentive paid from 
ACRNs within the production CLIN and the other 31.6 percent paid from an ACRN 
within the TES services containing CLIN.  Table 5 provides comparative FY 03 total 
contract, TES services CLIN, and positive and negative incentive amounts for each 
incentivized SWS subsystem TES services CLIN. 
 
 Table 5 
FY 03 SWS Contract, TES Services, and Applicable Incentive Dollar Comparison ($000) 
Contract  N00030-02-C-0100 N00030-02-C-0021 N00030-03-C-0005 N00030-03-C-0008 





















































(Source: Developed by Researcher) 
   
Table 5 indicates the following: (1) the incentivized SWS subsystems TES 
services efforts range from 20.7% of overall FY 03 effort in support of the fire control 
subsystem to 78.8% of overall FY 03 effort in support of the navigation subsystem with a 
mean of 27% and (2) maximum positive and negative performance incentives range from 
2.4% of TES services price in support of the fire control subsystem to 6.3% of TES 
services price in support of the missile subsystem with a mean of 5.2%.  The data indicate 
that incentivized SWS subsystem TES services comprised a significant portion of the 
overall SWS subsystem effort during FY 03 and that SSP offers SWS Contractors the 
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opportunity to earn substantial additional profit to maintain SWS performance levels 
through exceptional TES services delivery.    
An important contract related issue to note is in the area of contract reporting 
metrics.  PBSA efforts are reported from major DON buying Commands to ASN through 
two channels including DD 350s and HCA reporting metrics.  The DD 350 provides 
DOD and DON management with a wide array of business information concerning any 
individual action in excess of $25,000.  Line B1E [Ref. 39] provides the requirement to 
report whether an action is a performance-based service contract.  The data input person 
is instructed to enter code Y (for yes) when at least 80 percent of the contract value is for 
work that is performance-based and code N (for no) when code Y does not apply.  As 
detailed in Chapter II, Section B of this thesis the DON PBSA Implementation Plan 
requires HCAs to annually report PBSA metric information including the total estimated 
dollar value and numbers of actions related to service contract and PBSA contract 
awards.  Although the “80 percent rule” is stated within the plan the applicable service 
contract categories are limited whereas the DD 350 applies to all actions.  This 
instruction disconnect could result in discrepancies between the two data sources that 
may raise concerns as to the validity of PBSA reporting metrics.   
A review of the SWS subsystem contract data provided in Table 5 highlights an 
additional problem in contract reporting on omnibus type contracts.  The application of 
DD 350 Line B1E instruction to the individual SWS subsystem omnibus contracts would 
result in no PBSA dollars or actions reported when, arguably, SSP could report nearly 
$214M of PBSA activity.  In light of the intense pressure placed on buying Commands to 
convert service acquisitions to PBSA this interpretation issue could lead to further 
discrepancies in the two data sources.      
 
B. SWS PBSA IMPLEMENTATION 
 
1. Overarching Performance Incentives on CPIF LOE Contracts 
 
SSP has been applying system level performance incentives to CPIF LOE SWS 
subsystems TES service related CLINs since the late 1980s starting with the missile 
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subsystem contract and more recently with the navigation and fire control subsystems 
contracts.  Additionally, SSP has iteratively incorporated “intelligent” performance-based 
contracting language in service areas where it makes sense to let the Contractor 
determine how to provide service.  Philosophically, such language conversion is difficult 
in the case of a nuclear program where the Government is rightly held accountable for 
safety.  In reality much of the current contract language remains tightly specified by the 
Government.  Each transitioned SWS TES services effort had originally been performed 
under CPFF LOE contract types.  Each contract additionally contained a fee reduction 
provision stipulating the following: 
 
If the Contractor does not expend the total man-hours during the contract 
term, the Contracting Officer shall unilaterally modify the contract to 
either (1) reduce the contract fee by that amount which bears the same 
proportion to the contract fee as the number of unexpended man-hours 
bears to the total man-hours, or (2) require the Contractor to continue to 
work until the total man-hours are expended (consistent with the 
"Limitation of Cost" or "Limitation of Funds" clause). 
 
Therefore, under the terms of the contract the Contractor was motivated to deliver 
the negotiated amount of hours or incur a proportional fee reduction.  This contracting 
approach worked well in an environment where funding was plentiful as was the case on 
the SWS program through the late 1980s.  Performance levels were maintained due to the 
high levels of Contractor expertise assigned to the SWS program and overruns were 
quickly funded.  However, the approach became less attractive when the SWS program’s 
mission, standing, and budget were significantly reduced at the end of the Cold War.  
Theoretically the displacement of expertise from the SWS program could result in 
unacceptable system performance degradation.  In this era of declining budget and 
resulting loss of Contractor business base SSP needed to implement a contracting 
approach that would incentivize the SWS program’s business partners to retain key 
employees, control cost growth, and sustain system performance levels.  As a practical 
matter the offering of performance incentives to Contractors for CPIF LOE services 
provides them with a high rate of return on their investment with minimal performance 
risk.  Conversely, the SWS program benefits because the Contractor is tasked to make 
49 
cost/performance trade-offs in managing the skill level of assigned personnel.  The 
Contractor’s assignment of a high skill level of personnel makes the sustainment of 
system performance levels highly probable but risks fee reduction from both the failure to 
deliver the required hours, in accordance with the retained fee reduction provision, and 
the failure to stay within the target cost of the contract.  Vice versa the Contractor’s 
assignment of a low skill level of personnel makes delivering the required hours and 
staying below the target cost probable but risks fee reduction associated with reduced 
system performance levels.   
The conversion from a CPFF LOE to CPIF LOE contract structure did not 
materially affect the negotiation and contract development processes.  Cost proposals 
were based on ample and comparable performance history resulting in straightforward 
audit and cost negotiation processes.  Little disagreement occurred during fee 
negotiations since the Contractor received higher profit for performing substantially the 
same effort.  Contract terms and conditions were mostly unchanged and the “Limitation 
of Cost” and “Limitation of Funds” clauses remained applicable providing the 
Government with unchanged protections against cost overruns.   
Results of this contracting approach have been successful for the Government 
resulting in retention of a skilled labor force despite the industry-wide boom and bust of 
the 1990s and early 2000s, adequate cost growth notification and control, little additional 
administrative effort, and excellent sustained system level performance.  In fact, SWS 
performance levels under the cited contracts have not degraded over time and cost control 
has been generally maintained during an environment when the amount of contract 
dollars awarded to SWS Contractors has declined significantly.  The contracting 
approach has also been successful for the Contractors since their rate of return on 
investment for low cost and performance risk effort has increased substantially and a 
stable minimum volume of long-term work has been virtually assured.  Further, the 
quality of the delivered service did not change and quality measurement did not create a 
programmatic or administrative problem for the parties since the deliverable (hours) did 
not change when converted from a CPFF LOE to CPIF LOE contract type.    
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2. Overarching Performance Incentives on Completion Contracts 
 
SSP has attempted to implement a FPI completion contract type for SWS 
navigation subsystem TES services and has implemented a CPIF completion contract 
type for SWS launcher subsystem TES services in conjunction with an overarching 
performance incentive philosophy.  The philosophical contracting shift caused some 
adjustments in service delivery under the contracts discussed below and in the associated 
business relationships between SSP and the responsible Contractors.  CPFF LOE 
contracts had been exclusively used for TES services under all predecessor contracts for 
both subsystems.  Completion contract types have not attempted on the SWS missile and 
fire control subsystems TES services because of perceived performance risk. 
 
a. FPI Completion Contract Type   
 
The FY 99 SWS navigation subsystem TES services effort was contracted 
for under a FPI contract type [Ref. 40].  The Contractor’s cost proposal was developed 
using adequate historical CPFF LOE data making it relatively easy to audit and negotiate.  
Fee negotiations were in turn expeditious.  The Contractor eagerly accepted the 
opportunity to earn a higher base fee, due to allowances for contract type risk associated 
with FPI rather than CPFF LOE efforts [Ref. 41], and performance incentives for effort 
that had previously had no incentives.  The complicated portion of the conversion 
occurred during development of the associated contract language.  The Government and 
Contractor agreed to establish and identify deliverables in an Exhibit of the contract 
primarily based on historical Contract Data Requirements Lists, CDRLs.  Specific 
implementing contract language for the FPI effort (Item 0001) was subsequently placed 
in Sections B, C, F, and H and in Exhibits A - Item 0001 Exhibit Line Item (ELIN) 
Description and H - Incentive Plan.  Sections B, C, and F reflected standard language 
directing the reader to Exhibit A.  Exhibit A contained ELIN description, quantity, unit 
and extended billing price, delivery schedule, and shipment information for forty-six 
individual ELINs.  Exhibit H contained detailed incentive implementation information 
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including description, measurement method and conditions, and award determination 
procedures for accuracy, availability, launch availability, logistics effectiveness, and 
COTS Management performance incentives.   
The contract contained two special provisions in Section H relating to the 
FPI effort including the following: (1) Special Provision in Regards to the Contractual 
Incentive Structure and (2) Pre-negotiated Reduction for Revised Deliveries (Applicable 
to ELINs A001, A002 and A005).  The first provision specified performance incentive 
payment instructions since multiple ACRNs were involved.  The second provision 
addressed mutual concerns regarding the delivery quantity of SSBN Arrival Inspections, 
SSBN Upkeep Reports and TFR Response Summaries as specified in ELINs A001, A002 
and A005.  The parties agreed that the Contractor was not in control of the required 
quantities for each and agreed to incorporate protective language covering deliveries, 
billing price/target price adjustments, proportional allocations, prior adjustments, and 
diminished requirements.  Protective language specific to ELIN A005, TFR response 
summaries, is detailed below as an example. 
 
 c.  In the event the Contractor delivers less than the combined minimum 
quantities (as specified in Exhibit D) for all lots under ELIN A005, the 
Contracting Officer shall reduce the extended billing price under ELIN 
A005 and the target price of Item 0001 by the following amount: 
 
      Extended Billing 
 (348 - quantity delivered) X  Price of ELIN A005 
      348 
The unit billing price shall be reduced by the following amount: 
 
 Revised Extended Billing Price of ELIN A005 
        4 
 
Although the parties were able to agree on the contracting approach and 
implementing language the actual performance results were unsuccessful due to 
interpretive problems on both sides of the business relationship.  The final Item 0001 cost 
position reflected an overrun of approximately five percent.  The overrun resulted in 
extraordinary upper-level management attention by both parties although it fell well 
within the established ceiling price of 120 percent of target cost.  The historical 
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programmatic and budgetary philosophy was to manage to target.  Under a CPFF LOE 
contract the “Limitation of Cost” clause provides the Government enough advanced 
planning information to either stop work or increase funding.  Since historical 
performance had generally run to target the Comptroller had not adequately reserved 
funding to cover the overrun and the Command had to take unusual and unplanned steps 
to cover the liability or face an Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) violation.  Of greater concern 
was the increased program friction resulting from ingrained contract performance culture 
and the increased Contractor focus on profit maximization.  SSP program personnel were 
accustomed to unimpeded support and complete flexibility in mission reprioritization, if 
required, as allowed within a CPFF LOE contracting environment.  Conversely, the 
Contractor was reluctant to perform tasks that were not specifically established within an 
Exhibit A ELIN due to the profit implications of an FPI arrangement.  These opposing 
views led to friction between the parties and significantly increased program and 
administrative involvement by the Contracting Officer.   
Of final concern was the virtual impossibility of determining whether a 
deliverable met the intended quality standard.  This is directly attributable to the fact that 
quality standards had historically been specified in an overarching control document 
entitled “T9001A - Technical Program Management and Quality System Requirements 
for Navy Strategic Systems Programs Acquisitions with Requirements Applicability 
Matrix”.  When conversion occurred the parties agreed to retain the existing quality 
documentation instead of generating concrete quality standards per Item 0001 ELIN.  
Without individual quality standards neither the Government nor the Contractor could 
easily rate the delivered performance, proof of which was usually transmitted in the form 
of a report, and the default acceptance criteria simply became the verification that a 
report was actually submitted.  These experienced contract and performance management 
problems resulted in reassessment of the contracting approach, eventually resulting in the 
implementation of a CPIF LOE contracting philosophy with overarching performance 
incentives beginning in FY 00 and for all subsequent SWS navigation subsystem effort. 
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b. CPIF Completion Contract Type   
 
The FY 01 SWS launcher subsystem TES services were contracted for 
under a CPIF completion contract type [Ref. 42].  As was the case in the FPI attempt 
discussed above the Contractor’s cost proposal was developed using adequate historical 
CPFF LOE data making it relatively easy to audit and negotiate.  Similarly, fee 
negotiations were expeditious.  However, the contract language development approach 
differed substantially from that used in the FPI effort.  Instead of an in-depth tasking 
breakout and pricing exercise of the previously performed CPFF LOE effort the 
Government and Contractor agreed to price the effort using a bottom-line approach, 
incorporate maximum flexibility in the contract language, and establish deliverables 
within a special Exhibit that referenced specific CDRL Items.  Implementing contract 
language for the CPIF effort (Item 0005) was subsequently placed in Sections B, C, and F 
and in Exhibits C - FY 01 C4/D5 Launcher Subsystem Support for Deployed SSBNs, F - 
CDRLs, and T - Incentive Plan.  Sections B, C, and F reflected standard language 
directing the reader to Exhibits C and F.   
Exhibit C contained only two ELINs, C001 and C002, that individually 
referred to a unique CDRL.  ELIN C001 referred to CDRL F00X – Quarterly Summary 
Progress Report and ELIN C002 referred to CDRL F00Y – Quarterly Incentive Claim 
Report.  An important element of Exhibit C was the following clarifying language: 
 
Quarterly Summary Progress Reports include summary of progress for 
Item 0005 completion CDRLs F001, F002, F004, F006-F00A, F00C-
F00F, F00H, F00L-F00R, F00S-F013, F015-F01E, F01J-F01R, and F01Z-
F023   
 
The language clarifies that the Exhibit C ELINs are simply transmittal 
documents and clearly establishes that the CDRLs are the lower level deliverables of the 
contract.  Exhibit F then established the detailed descriptive language and delivery 
requirements for each completion deliverable.  Exhibit T contained a detailed incentive 
summary, incentive determination, and accomplishment instructions for tool set 
development plan – launcher performance, D5 launcher subsystem test countdown 
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delays, D5 launcher/missile system performance, missile launch failure, on-load and off-
load performance, missile handling equipment availability, IETM development, and 
launcher system material availability performance incentives.  
The actual performance results of this flexible approach have been 
successful in comparison to the FPI approach.  As was the case under the predecessor 
CPFF LOE contract type the CPIF completion contract type requires the Contractor to 
notify the Government of costs incurred in excess of 75 percent in accordance with the 
“Limitation of Cost” clause.  The cost notification requirement contained within the 
clause provided the program office with some protection against cost overruns that 
helped to mitigate performance risk.  The contract type was also perceived as more 
effective than the traditional CPFF LOE contracting approach in ensuring that the 
Contractor performed efforts most critical to the program office.  In addition the program 
office experienced less resistance when requesting mission reprioritization.  The 
Contractor was initially concerned about their potential inability to deliver firm 
deliverables if an emergent requirement occurred but the parties worked well together 
during the performance period in managing the deliverables to contract target.  Therefore 
the overall approach resulted in a win-win scenario.  The Government was provided more 
cost and performance control and the Contractor was provided a higher return on their 
investment and improved programmatic response.       
Weaknesses still existed, however in determining whether a deliverable 
met the intended quality standard.  Similarly to the FPI effort the parties agreed to retain 
the existing quality documentation instead of generating concrete quality standards per 
deliverable resulting in uncertainty as to how well a service had been delivered.  The 
CPIF completion approach with overarching performance incentives has become the 
accepted contracting approach for the SWS launcher subsystem TES services effort.  The 
parties have additionally attempted to work together in subsequent contracts to focus on 
areas of performance concern through a targeted incentive approach that will be 
discussed in the next section.   
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3. Targeted Performance Incentives on CPIF LOE and CPIF 
Completion Contracts 
 
The natural evolution of performance incentive application is to attach incentives 
to those tasks that are critical to attaining system level performance or that have 
experienced performance problems.  The Researcher refers to this activity as targeted 
incentive analysis and application.  The parties in the business relationship must work 
together in identifying the targeted tasks and developing an acceptable incentive strategy 
to improve performance on problem tasks and sustain performance on non-problematic 
but critical tasks.  Targeted performance incentives on the SWS program have been 
sporadic and relatively recent.  A listing of targeted incentives on SSP SWS subsystem 
contracts was provided in Chapter IV, Section A above.  The implementation process has 
been challenging despite the fact that long-term business relationships exist between the 
parties.  The Government has had problems relinquishing process control and the 
Contractor has been reluctant to accept the additional performance risk and process 
management responsibility.  In most cases the additional incentive pool amounts assigned 
the targeted area provide little motivation for the increased Contractor responsibility.  For 
instance the fire control system provides incentive pools ranging in value from $10,000 to 
$60,000 over a number of targeted tasks on an $18.6M CLIN on a nearly $90M contract.  
A $90M contract represents a small percentage of a large defense contractor’s business 
base.  An obvious question is whether the Government should expect such relatively 
small incentive pools to materially improve a large defense Contractor’s performance.  
Vice versa should the Government assign larger incentive pools to lower tiered 
performance elements in the hopes of attaining marginal performance improvement.  
These answers are not easy to predict and the parties generally need to work through a 
performance cycle to measure behavioral changes.  The increased monitoring 
requirement and uncertainty in achieved performance improvement raises concerns as to 
whether the benefits attained are worth the administrative costs of attaining them.  
Indeed the future practicality of targeted incentives at SSP remains unclear as 
evidenced by the following actual comprehensive PBSA conversion attempt.  The SWS 
launcher subsystem attempted to convert its entire FY 03 deployed systems support effort 
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($31M of planned budget), including TES services and other efforts, to a performance-
based targeted incentive service contract.  The implementation process generally 
followed the PBSA implementation presented in Chapter II, Section C of this thesis.  An 
executive steering committee consisting of both SSP and Contractor senior level 
management was briefed on the proposed conversion and agreed to proceed.  A senior 
project engineer was assigned as the lead for the project and attended a commercially 
offered PBSA training course.  After completion of the individual training the project 
lead properly established a multifunctional PBSA team consisting of Government 
program and field representative personnel, Contractor counterparts, and outside 
Contractor support personnel as permanent team members and contracting and legal 
personnel as advisory team members.  It should be noted that a team charter was 
developed but never formally approved because the executive steering committee 
considered it unnecessary.  All permanent team members participated in an exclusive 
training program offered by the previously mentioned commercial provider.  As part of 
the training the provider acted as a facilitator for team brainstorming.  Team members 
were subsequently segregated by areas of expertise and conducted internet-based market 
research to determine whether the team could leverage off of another organization’s 
PBSA conversion of similar engineering service effort in their respective assigned area.  
None of the individual teams were able to find any similar efforts.   
The individual teams then conducted a thorough job analysis of each area.  
Unfortunately, the attitude towards the project changed from positive to negative as the 
individual groups began to report that a PBSA conversion of their particular areas would 
be too risky and ineffective.  After a complete analysis had been performed and 
significant administrative costs had been incurred the parties agreed to attempt a PBSA 
conversion of logistics provisioning only ($800K of the originally planned $31M budget).  
The team members responsible for logistics provisioning developed a comprehensive 
performance work statement that provided the scope of work; documentation 
requirements; a performance requirements summary including an identification of 
required services and associated performance standards, acceptable quality levels, and 
monitoring methods and responsibilities; Government quality assurance roles and 
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responsibilities; and logistics provisioning task definitions.  The team also developed two 
incentives specific to the PBSA effort including (1) a man-hour reduction incentive with 
a maximum positive incentive available to earn of $50,000 and no negative incentive and 
(2) a trouble failure report reduction incentive with a maximum positive/negative 
incentive available to earn/lose of +/- $25,000.  The finalized package was briefed to the 
executive steering committee, which finally approved moving forward with a further 
reduced amount of PBSA tasks. 
Performance results of the converted PBSA effort have not been fully assessed.  
Preliminary indications are that the Government is moderately uncomfortable about the 
change in process control while the Contractor claims that the only efficiency savings 
that have occurred are those associated with the reduction of Government oversight.  
However, the experienced PBSA conversion process performance is troubling.  The 
environment seemed to be ripe for conversion of a significant amount of deployed 
systems support effort in that management had verbally bought into the idea, the PBSA 
model was generally followed with a few minor exceptions, participants were properly 
trained and focused, the parties had intimate knowledge of the required tasking and 
historical performance levels, and a generous incentive package was available.  The 
disappointing results were that significant resources and administrative costs were 
incurred, less than two percent of the target effort was converted, participants were 
frustrated and would likely not volunteer for future attempts, and both Government and 
Contractor management ultimately balked at accepting any perceived additional risk. 
 
C. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
 
The SWS program experiences with PBSA on TES services have been 
evolutionary but limited.  In fact it is difficult to define any of the SWS subsystem efforts 
discussed above as 100 percent PBSA when measured against the standard model 
developed in Chapter II, Section C of this thesis.  In all resulting contracts the 
Government has retained significant control and oversight of Contractor processes and 
performance.  Nevertheless the SWS program appears to be ahead of the PBSA learning 
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curve when compared with other MDAPs at a minimum and possibly even with less 
complex efforts.  From a PBSA metric reporting standpoint this fact holds true, as SSP is 
ahead of all other major system commands since all of the discussed TES services 
contracts are reported as PBSA type contracts on the associated DD 350 and through 
HCA reported metrics. 
SSP’s PBSA experience is consistent with findings from a recent GAO PBSA 
review.  In a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement 
Policy, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives dated September 
2002 the GAO concluded that guidance is needed for using performance-based service 
contracting [Ref. 43].  The report focused on a review of 25 total contracts submitted by 
various agencies to measure against four OFPP defined essential performance-based 
attributes as follows: (1) Describe the requirements in terms of results required rather 
than the methods of performance of the work, (2) Set measurable performance standards, 
(3) Describe how the contractor’s performance will be evaluated in a quality assurance 
plan, and (4) Identify positive and negative incentives when appropriate.  Findings of the 
review were as follows: (1) nine of the contracts for services widely performed in the 
commercial sector clearly exhibited all of the attributes, (2) four of the contracts for 
services widely performed in the commercial sector were very prescriptive in how the 
work should be carried out, and (3) twelve contracts for more unique and complex 
services determined that they still needed to be prescriptive and to exert strong oversight 
because of safety, cost, and/or technical risks.  The SWS program PBSA efforts generally 
fall into the last category of audited contracts.  However, progress has been made with 
each attribute on some of the TES services elements described in Chapter III, Section C 
of this thesis and SSP is clearly advanced in attribute (4), identification of positive and 
negative incentives when appropriate.   
 Other considerations in future PBSA conversion attempts at SSP concern the 
effort’s relevancy and benefits.  A primary question is how does the conversion of SWS 
TES services to PBSA benefit the Navy and SSP?  ASN(RD&A) has requested PBSA 
metric information to answer the following questions as detailed in Chapter II, Section B: 
(1) Was competition increased?, (2) Did a Non-traditional Contractor participate?, (3) 
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Did a Non-traditional Contractor get the award?, (4) Did use of PBSA save time?, and (5) 
Did use of PBSA result in cost savings?  The answer to these questions based on results 
of the discussed SWS TES services PBSA conversion attempts would be (1) competition 
was not increased, (2) a non-traditional Contractor did not compete, (3) a non-traditional 
Contractor did not receive the award, (4) use of PBSA added rather than saved time, and 
(5) use of PBSA did not result in savings and in some instances resulted in additional 
cost.  In addition, since high performance standards were designed into the SWS it is 
uncertain as to whether incentivizing sustained performance is meaningful.  A question 
that should be asked is whether the application of an overarching or targeted incentive 
would actually impact performance given existing SWS performance standards.  If it 
wouldn’t then the Government should not offer the Contractor easily attainable additional 
profit.  Conversely, is it reasonable to force long-term business partners to accept 
increased performance risk without providing additional profit opportunities?  Based on 
the answers to these questions it appears that the complete conversion of SWS TES 
services to PBSA is neither practicable nor desirable.   
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter IV has presented an in-depth analysis of SWS subsystem contracts and 
related TES services conversion attempts to PBSA.  SWS subsystem PBSA conversion 
was presented as having been evolutionary over at least a fifteen-year period with proven 
successes and failures.  It was noted that four of the six SWS subsystem omnibus 
contracts contained some measure of TES services PBSA implementation although the 
number of converted TES services elements has been limited.  The concepts of 
overarching and targeted incentives were introduced and developed.  Summary analysis 
concluded that the SWS program will generally still need to be prescriptive and to exert 
strong oversight because of safety, cost, and/or technical risks.  Finally, the chapter raised 
questions as to the benefits and relevancy of complete SWS subsystem TES services 
PBSA conversion.  Chapter V will provide conclusions, recommendations, and answers 
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V. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND ANSWERS 




This thesis provided a Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Navy 
(DON), and Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Strategic Weapon System (SWS) 
program acquisition and Performance Based Service Acquisition (PBSA) history 
background, reviewed overarching PBSA policy and the DON PBSA implementation 
plan, defined a working PBSA model, defined Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs), detailed the SWS program structure, defined target SWS Technical 
Engineering Support (TES) services, and reviewed and analyzed SWS TES service 
contracts and associated PBSA implementation attempts.  Chapter V provides 
conclusions, recommendations, answers to the primary and secondary thesis research 




1. The Government Considers the Acquisition of Commercially 
Available Services a Key and Growing Component of Its Overall 
Mission and Has Undergone a Philosophical Shift in Service 
Acquisition Strategy Towards PBSA   
 
In FY 1991 the percentages of dollars expended for supplies and equipment 
acquisition and service acquisition to overall acquisition were 44.4 percent and 33.6 
percent, respectively.  In FY 1999 the percentages of dollars for supplies and equipment 
acquisition and service acquisition to overall acquisition were 35.1 percent and 42.6 
percent, respectively.  In addition to the growth in service acquisition the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) has routinely provided testimony before the United States 
House of Representatives and Senate concluding that the Government is mismanaging 
service contracts.  Background research has established that the DoD is the largest 
acquisition component within the federal budget and the DON is DoD’s largest 
acquisition component.  The DON is comprised of ten buying Commands that provide 
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facilities, research activity, supplies, and services in support of the fleet.  Overall FY 
2002 DON PBSA metric data indicates that 14.8% of all DON service related actions and 
18.68% of all DON service related dollars were acquired through the use of PBSA.  In 
addition there is a wide range of performance among the System Commands with PBSA 
action data ranging from 5.21% to 37.67% of all service actions and PBSA dollar data 
ranging from 6.1% to 48.01% of all service dollars. 
 
2. Evolutionary PBSA Policy Foundation and Implementation Guidance 
Supports That the Government Is Becoming Increasingly Focused on 
Improving the Efficiency of Service Acquisitions Through the Use of 
PBSA   
 
The Office of Federal Procurement and Policy Public Law (OFPP P.L.) 91-2 
dated 9 April 1991 provided a definition of performance-based contracting and 
established the Government’s service contracting policy.  Federal Acquisition Circular 
(FAC) 97-01 dated 22 August 1997 implemented OFPP P.L. 91-2 through the 
amendment of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Parts 7, 16, 37, 42, 46, and 52.  
FAR Subpart 37.6 set forth general implementing requirements and guidance on the 
Statement of Work, Quality Assurance, Selection Procedures, Contract Type, and 
Follow-on and Repetitive Requirements aspects of PBSA.  Section 821 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, P.L. 106-398, directed a FAR revision to 
establish a preference for Performance-Based Service Contracting.  The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Memorandum M-01-15 dated 9 March 2001 established 
that the FY 2002 PBSC goal was to award contracts over $25,000 using PBSA 
techniques for not less than 20 percent of the total eligible service contracting dollars.   
FAC 97-25 dated 2 May 2001 implemented Section 821 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2001, P.L. 106-398 by amending FAR Subpart 37.102, Service 
Contracting Policy, to state that performance-based contracting is the preferred method 
for acquiring services.  On 5 April 2000 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
and Technology (USD(A&T)) issued a PBSA memorandum for the Secretaries of the 
Military departments Directors, Defense Agencies Director, and Defense Logistics 
Agency establishing that, at a minimum, 50 percent of service acquisitions, measured 
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both in dollars and actions, are to be performance-based by the year 2005.  On 2 January 
2002 the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) promulgated Section 821 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001, P.L. 106-398 to the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments Directors, Defense Agencies. 
This thesis developed a PBSA model that consolidated associated FAR language 
and three PBSA guidance publications including (1) “A Guide to Best Practices for 
Performance-Based Service Contracting” issued by OFPP in October 1998; (2) 
“Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department of 
Defense (DOD)” issued by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology in December 2000; and (3) “Seven Steps to Performance-Based Services 
Acquisition” (web-based) issued in January 2002 by a team comprised of members from 
the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, and Treasury, the General Services 
Administration, and Acquisition Solutions (Contractor).  The PBSA model identified five 
key activities including establishment of a multifunctional team, market research, 
requirements generation, source selection, and contract performance.  Establishment of a 
multifunctional team is an essential first step for successfully executing a PBSA and 
discussion revolved around team membership and management.  The market research and 
source selection activities are generally consistent with other type of federal acquisitions 
and discussion leveraged upon existing federal regulation.  Two alternative requirements 
generation approaches were developed including the Performance Work Statement 
(PWS) and Statement of Objectives (SOO).  A PWS generally includes the development 
of a job analysis, performance objectives, performance standards, acceptable quality 
levels, and a performance requirements summary.  The SOO is a much different 
requirements approach in that the Government provides the Contractor with a set of high-
level performance objectives and allows the Contractor to propose a detailed performance 
plan.  Key elements of the contract performance activity include service delivery, 
surveillance, contract administration, conflict resolution, and performance measurement. 
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3. The DON Has Complied With Federal and DoD Policies and Has 
Developed a Responsive and Detailed Implementation Plan Including 
the Identification of Key Reporting Metrics   
 
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition 
(ASN(RD&A)) was established as the focal point for implementing DON PBSA and 
subsequently issued PBSA guidance and criteria to all functional areas of the DON 
acquisition community.  The DON implementation plan stipulates that (1) a DON 
contract can be categorized as PBSA if at least 80% of its dollar value met the criteria of 
FAR 37.6 to be categorized as PBSA, (2) standard commercial services may be 
considered PBSA, and (3) the plan applied to service requirements exceeding the DD 350 
reporting threshold of $25,000.   The implementation plan also identified the service 
contract categories to which PBSA applies including: maintenance, overhaul, repair, 
service, rehabilitation, salvage, modernization or modification of supplies, systems or 
equipment; maintenance of real property; base operations and support contracts; 
operation of Government-owned equipment, facilities and systems; education and 
training; medical services; program management support; and Research and 
Development (less basic and applied research).  The Heads of Contracting Activities 
(HCAs) were requested to provide PBSA metrics including the total service contract 
awards, total PBSA contract awards, and PBSA compliance rate by estimated dollars and 
numbers of actions in order to assess DON PBSA implementation effectiveness.  
Conducted research revealed that a disconnect exists between the DD 350 Line B1E 
(Performance-Based Service Contract) and Navy PBSA implementation plan metric 
reporting instructions that could result in ASN data base discrepancies that may raise 
concerns as to the validity of PBSA reporting metrics.  Additionally, the application of 
DD 350 Line B1E instruction to the individual SWS subsystem omnibus contracts would 
result in no PBSA dollars or actions reported when, arguably, SSP could report nearly 
$214M of PBSA activity.  In light of the intense pressure placed on buying Commands to 
convert service acquisitions to PBSA this interpretation issue could lead to further 
discrepancies in the two data sources. 
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  4.  The Majority of DoD Funding Is Expended on MDAPs and as a Rsult 
Their Formation, Execution, and Oversight Is Complex and Evolved.   
 
DoD acquisition programs are established as a result of detailed threat assessment 
and requirements generation processes set forth in OMB Circular A-109 and the 
Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986.  Formative requirements 
generation documents include the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military 
Strategy (NMS), Mission Area Analysis (MAA), Mission Need Statement (MNS), 
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD).  
Performance specifications and baselines translate the ORD into a Request for Proposal 
(RFP) and resulting contract.  The requirements generation system initiates the Planning, 
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and Acquisition Management (AM) 
decision support systems. DoD acquisition programs are categorized by Acquisition 
Category (ACAT) designation including ACATs I (various), II, III, and IV.  The ACAT 
designation of a program determines the level of oversight for key milestones within the 
program’s development, production, testing and deployment.  Major systems receive 
ACATs I (various) and II designations.  ACAT I programs are further defined as 
MDAPs, designated as ID or IC, or Major Automated Information Systems Acquisition 
Programs (MAISAPs), designated as IAM or IAC.  MDAPs are designated by the 
USD(AT&L).  A program is considered an MDAP if its projected development effort 
exceeds $365 million or its projected procurement effort exceeds $2.19 billion.  There are 
currently 10 ACAT ID and 16 ACAT IC MDAPs within the DON.  MDAPs are 
conceived, managed, reviewed, and approved through the Defense Acquisition 
Management Framework contained within the new DoD 5000.2 instruction approved on 
12 May 2003.  The Defense Acquisition Management Framework details an overarching 
program acquisition cycle that includes three milestone decision points (A, B, and C) and 
five distinct progression phases including Concept Refinement (CR), Technology 
Development (TD), System Development & Demonstration (SDD), Production & 
Deployment (PD), and Operations & Support (OS) with each distinct phase containing 
service acquisition efforts. 
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5. MDAP OS Phase Engineering Services Have a Relatively High 
Probability for Successful Conversion Into a PBSA Arrangement 
Compared to Other Stated Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework Phases   
 
Specific engineering service effort within the OS phase relates to the operational 
sustainment and upgrade of deployed systems.  During the OS phase the Contractor 
normally accepts a significant portion of the contract and performance risk through the 
establishment of Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) and Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract types 
with performance incentives attached to firm system performance targets.  Within this 
phase the Contractor has collected substantial system and labor force performance data 
that can be relied upon to adequately project target performance levels and establish a 
realistic performance measurement baseline.  The engineering labor mix within the OS 
phase should generally align with engineering services actuals incurred during the PD 
and early OS phase efforts.   Additionally, recent GAO findings make it clear that the 
largest element of a weapon’s total ownership cost is OS and that the DoD must focus on 
developing processes that contribute to reducing operations, maintenance, and disposal 
costs to free up funding for the development of new weapons systems [Ref. 32: p.4].  
Successful application of PBSA principles during engineering services efforts occurring 
within the OS phase may be one process that can help control an MDAP’s total 
ownership cost.  
 
6. SSP’s SWS Program Is an MDAP With the Predominant Portion of 
Its TES Services Residing in the OS Phase   
 
SSP is one of DON’s buying Commands and provides our nation’s submarine-
launched nuclear deterrent, the ACAT IC designated SWS TRIDENT D5 Missile and 
associated delivery subsystems.  The SWS program was conceived and has been 
executed within a framework of long-term, sole-source Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) teams and Integrated Process Teams (IPTs) involving several 
geographically dispersed large defense Contractors and SSP field activities.  The current 
D5 configuration is fully deployed.  Key hardware elements of the SWS include the 
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missile, guidance, navigation, launcher, fire control, and test instrumentation subsystems 
with a planned FY 04 through FY 08 budget of approximately $7.4B in then year dollars.  
SSP negotiates and awards each major SWS subsystem Contractor an annual contract for 
sustaining TES services.  The overarching mission of each Contractor is to maintain 
existing performance standards relating to SWS accuracy, availability, launch reliability, 
logistics effectiveness, and parts obsolescence and Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
management.  Each subsystem has its own unique set of performance parameters that 
contribute to the overall SWS performance targets.  In this respect, performance 
degradation in any of the subsystems could cause overall SWS performance problems. 
The SWS program includes 29 general TES services as follows: Accuracy 
Evaluation and Maintenance Support; Analysis and Evaluations of Patrol Data; Computer 
Resources Support; Configuration Management Support; Contract Data Management 
Support; Follow-on Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Evaluation Test (FCET) and 
Demonstration and Shakedown Operations (DASO) Support; Fleet Documentation 
Support; Life Cycle Management Support; Logistics Support; Maintainability and 
Maintenance Support; Obsolescence Management Support; On/Off-Site Field 
Engineering Support; Performance Evaluation Support; Problem Identification, 
Investigation, and Solution; Program Management Support; Quality Assurance and 
Surveillance Support; Reliability Support; Repairs Support; Safety Program Support; 
Software Development and Maintenance Support; Strategic Programs Alteration 
(SPALT) Technical Assistance; Subsystem-unique equipment support; Strategic 
Weapons Facility Atlantic (SWFLANT) and Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific 
(SWFPAC) Support; Systems Evaluations and Design Technical Assistance; Support 
Planning Assistance; Test Equipment Support; Test Facility Operation and Maintenance; 
Trouble Failure Report (TFR) Analysis and Corrective Action Reports (CARs) Support; 
and Training Support.   Detailed differences between the levels and types of support for 
each TES service task exist between Contractors and subsystems.  The breadth of 
engineering disciplines involved in supporting these efforts include design, systems, 
software, electrical, manufacturing, mechanical, industrial, materials, component, test, 
field, quality, and logistics engineers. 
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7. SSP Has Implemented Overarching Incentive Structures on TES 
Services Contracts Under Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) Level-of-
Effort (LOE), FPI Completion, and CPIF Completion Contracting 
Instruments   
 
An overarching performance incentive can be defined as an incentive that is 
associated with key hardware performance parameters but is applied against TES 
services.  The general philosophy behind the overarching performance incentive 
approach is that the existing levels of performance associated with the TRIDENT missile 
and its delivery systems can’t be sustained without excellent TES services delivery.  Each 
transitioned SWS TES services effort had originally been performed under Cost Plus 
Fixed Fee (CPFF) LOE contract types with intensive focus on technical performance 
rather than cost control. Implementing performance-based language has been challenging 
since the Government is justifiably concerned about process control on a nuclear program 
where it is rightly held accountable for safety.  In reality much of the current contract 
language remains tightly specified by the Government. 
Overarching system level performance incentives have been applied to CPIF LOE 
SWS subsystems TES service related CLINs since the late 1980s starting with the missile 
subsystem contract and more recently with the navigation and fire control subsystems 
contracts.  The conversion from a CPFF LOE to CPIF LOE contract structure did not 
materially affect the negotiation and contract development processes.  Results of this 
contracting approach have been successful for the Government resulting in retention of a 
skilled labor force despite the industry-wide boom and bust of the 1990s and early 2000s, 
adequate cost growth notification and control, little additional administrative effort, and 
excellent sustained system level performance.  The contracting approach has also been 
successful for the Contractors since their rate of return on investment for low cost and 
performance risk effort has increased substantially and a stable minimum volume of long-
term work has been virtually assured.  Further, the quality of the delivered service did not 
create a programmatic or administrative problem for the parties since the deliverable 
(hours) did not change when converted from a CPFF LOE to CPIF LOE contract type. 
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The FY 99 SWS navigation subsystem TES services effort was contracted for 
under a FPI contract type with overarching performance incentives.  Although the parties 
were able to agree on the contracting approach and implementing language during the 
negotiation process the actual performance results were unsuccessful due to interpretive 
problems on both sides of the business relationship.  The TES services effort overran by 
approximately five percent resulting in extraordinary upper-level management attention 
by both parties due to increased program friction, significantly increased program and 
administrative involvement by the Contracting Officer, and the virtual impossibility of 
determining whether a deliverable met the intended quality standard.  The experienced 
contract and performance management problems resulted in reassessment of the 
contracting approach, eventually resulting in the implementation of a CPIF LOE 
contracting philosophy with overarching performance incentives beginning in FY 00 and 
for all subsequent SWS navigation subsystem effort. 
The FY 01 SWS launcher subsystem TES services were contracted for under a 
CPIF completion contract type with overarching performance incentives.  The contract 
language development approach differed substantially from that used in the FPI effort 
and provided significantly more flexibility.  The actual performance results of this 
flexible approach were more successful than the FPI approach as the Government was 
provided more cost and performance control and the Contractor was provided a higher 
return on their investment and improved programmatic response.  However, weaknesses 
still existed in determining whether a deliverable met the intended quality standard.  The 
CPIF completion approach with overarching performance incentives has become the 
accepted contracting approach for the SWS launcher subsystem TES services effort. 
 
8. Targeted Performance Incentives on the SWS Program Have Been 
Sporadic and Relatively Recent With Experienced Implementation 
Challenges Despite Existing Long-term Business Relationships   
 
A targeted performance incentive can be defined as an incentive that is associated 
with a particular TES services element.  The general philosophy behind the targeted 
performance incentive approach is to incentivize specific important TES service elements 
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that directly affect the overall system performance.  A TES service element can be 
designated important as a result of experienced performance problems or because of the 
magnitude of its contribution to system level performance.  The Government has had 
problems relinquishing process control and the Contractor has been reluctant to accept 
the additional performance risk and process management responsibility.  In most cases 
the additional incentive pool amounts assigned the targeted area provide little motivation 
for the increased Contractor responsibility.  Increased monitoring requirements and 
uncertainty in achieved performance improvement lead to concerns as to whether the 
benefits attained are worth the administrative costs of attaining them.  The SWS launcher 
subsystem participants attempted to convert the entire FY 03 deployed systems support 
effort ($31M of planned budget), including TES services and other efforts, to a 
performance-based targeted incentive service contract.  The implementation process 
generally followed the PBSA implementation presented in Chapter II, Section C of this 
thesis.  After a complete analysis had been performed and significant administrative costs 
had been incurred the parties agreed to attempt a PBSA conversion of logistics 
provisioning only ($800K of the originally planned $31M budget) with only part of the 
effort finally converted.  Performance results of the converted PBSA effort have not been 
fully assessed.  Preliminary indications are that the Government is moderately 
uncomfortable about the change in process control while the Contractor claims that the 
only efficiency savings that have occurred are those associated with the reduction of 
Government oversight.  The disappointing results were that significant resources and 
administrative costs were incurred, less than two percent of the target effort was 
converted, participants were frustrated and would likely not volunteer for future attempts, 
and both Government and Contractor management ultimately balked at accepting any 
perceived additional risk. 
 
9. The Complete Conversion of SWS TES Services to PBSA Is Neither 
Practicable Nor Desirable   
 
The SWS program experiences with PBSA on TES services have been 
evolutionary but limited.  Although SSP has attempted to convert some SWS TES 
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services to PBSA, the SWS program will generally still need to be prescriptive and to 
exert strong oversight because of safety, cost, and/or technical risks.  SSP’s PBSA 
experience is consistent with findings from a recent GAO PBSA review concluding that 
guidance and limitations are needed in implementing performance-based service 
contracting [Ref. 43].  Nevertheless the SWS program appears to be ahead of the PBSA 
learning curve when compared with other MDAPs at a minimum and possibly even with 
less complex efforts.  Fundamental considerations in future PBSA conversion attempts at 
SSP concern the effort’s relevancy and benefits.  A primary question is how does the 
conversion of all or parts of SWS TES services to PBSA benefit the Navy and SSP?  
Based on SSP’s PBSA conversion experience a clear benefit does not exist since it did 
not increase competition, encourage non-traditional Contractors to participate, save time, 
and result in cost savings.  In addition, since high performance standards were designed 
into the SWS it is uncertain as to whether incentivizing sustained performance is 
meaningful.  A question that should be asked is whether the application of an overarching 
or targeted incentive would actually impact performance given existing SWS 
performance standards.  If it wouldn’t then the Government should not offer the 
Contractor easily attainable additional profit.  Conversely is it reasonable to force long-
term business partners to accept increased performance risk without providing additional 




1. The DoD and DON Should Identify the Core Program and Business 
Conditions That Must Exist for PBSA to Be Effective 
 
Historical PBSA policy promulgation and guidance documents have been 
effective in providing a broad PBSA definition, communicating PBSA implementation 
procedures, and demonstrating that the DoD and DON are serious about applying PBSA 
to the maximum extent practicable.  This “transformation” approach was required since 
service acquisition has become a major component of DoD and DON acquisition and has 
been historically mismanaged.  However, existing policy presumes that all services 
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acquisition can eventually be transitioned into a PBSA environment and that significant 
performance improvements and cost reductions will occur if Contractors are given the 
responsibility and flexibility to manage program processes.  Although the DON 
Implementation plan requires PBSA only on selected service contract categories it does 
not provide guidance on what core program and business conditions must exist for PBSA 
to be effective.   
The findings of this thesis and various GAO reports support that PBSA is not 
effective for all services.  There is no doubt that PBSA can be effective in a commercially 
provided service arena, such as computer help desk operations, where significant 
competition exists and Contractors within the industry are motivated to either technically 
or programmatically outperform competitors.  However, the chances for successful PBSA 
implementation decrease as competition in a service sector decreases.  Similarly, the 
chances for successful PBSA implementation is impacted by the technical and 
performance risk of a program.  Contractors are generally willing to take performance or 
programmatic risks while providing noncomplex or non-hazardous services.  Such an 
environment can provide increased efficiency and corresponding cost savings.  However, 
Contractors generally perform conservatively if the chances of performance failure are 
great due to the technical complexity of the operation or if excessive safety liabilities 
exist.  
PBSA is perceived as a panacea by DoD and DON leadership as budgets decline, 
the need for weapons modernization increases, and intense pressure is placed on buying 
Commands to reduce MDAP development, production, and total ownership costs.  
Consequently, leadership within the buying Commands is aggressively directing the 
acquisition community to implement PBSA to the maximum extent practicable.  In 
response the acquisition community is expending significant resources and has 
experienced major confusion and frustration over how to make PBSA work in any 
business environment and for complex and hazardous service efforts.  Although major 
administrative costs have been expended, few complex services have been converted and 
even fewer have ever realized an increase in efficiency or cost savings.  Providing a 
business case model that programs could use to effectively determine whether PBSA 
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conversion is meaningful and achievable for their specific services and business 
environment could (1) focus attention on those programs with a high probability of PBSA 
conversion success, (2) relieve the political and management pressure placed on the 
acquisition community to convert all services, (3) reduce the general implementation 
frustration level, and (4) reduce administrative costs in an era of workforce reduction. 
 
2. PBSA Training Curriculums Should Include a Practical Module on 
Determining Whether PBSA Implementation Is Relevant for the 
Student’s Command and Program  
 
 Training institutions have naturally reacted to the Government’s clear 
commitment to PBSA and endorsement that proper training is a key ingredient to 
successful PBSA implementation.  The number of PBSA training programs has increased 
and the quality of the available training has improved as successful field implementation 
has evolved.  Initial PBSA training was more focused on definition and model 
development while current PBSA training is more focused on successful implementation.  
Some if not all programs offer facilitators to Commands desiring external assistance.  
From a pure business perspective facilitation offers the training institution increased 
access to PBSA related activity and associated budget.  Accordingly, PBSA training 
providers could become increasingly incentivized to instruct students that PBSA is 
meaningful and achievable on all services in an effort to maximize revenue. 
Requiring PBSA training providers to provide a module on determining whether 
PBSA is meaningful and achievable for each student’s program and business 
environment could avert this natural business progression.  Students would be required to 
bring a representative statement of work from their service contracts and overall 
Command business characteristics (i.e. what percentage of the Command’s service 
business is competed, average related contract dollar amount, etc.) to class in order to 
perform a task and business analysis of their specific programs during earlier training 
modules.  The resulting output would then be used as input to the “determination” 
module.  Results of the analysis could ultimately serve as a go/no-go decision for PBSA 
conversion attempts at the student’s Command.  The required module would limit 
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fruitless PBSA conversion attempts and could stimulate innovation within the PBSA 
training community.            
  
3. DON Reporting Metrics Should Be Revised to More Accurately 
Capture PBSA Conversion Performance 
  
 DON’s implementation plan requires HCAs to provide PBSA metrics to assess 
DON effectiveness in implementing PBSA.  HCAs must provide the total service 
contract awards, PBSA contract awards, and PBSA compliance rate by total estimated 
dollars and total number of actions for each specific business area.  The existing PBSA 
metrics structure unnecessarily increases Command administrative time in metric 
collection and reporting and drives Commands to attempt PBSA conversion on all service 
contracts in order to improve its “compliance” rate.  Buying Commands should provide 
ASN with an assessment of program service contracts that should and should not be 
converted to PBSA.  Justification and approval should be required for those services 
where PBSA should not apply and the Command would be relieved from the obligation 
of reporting on those excluded services.  The Command would additionally be required to 
submit revised justification if a material element of its initial justification on an excluded 
service changed (i.e. a sole-source effort was converted to competitive).    
Additionally, ASN should allow Commands to report on all PBSA conversion 
activity rather than just those contracts that have at least 80% of its dollar value meeting 
the criteria of FAR 37.6.  The current restriction eliminates some PBSA conversion 
accomplishment from being reported, as is the case on a large omnibus contract with 
substantial production effort, leading to an inaccurate performance measure.  Finally, 
ASN should accept the HCA metric data, not the DD 350, as the definitive database 
resource for upward reporting of DON PBSA conversion performance to eliminate 
confusion created by conflicting database information.  The resulting effectiveness and 
efficiency of PBSA metric reporting and associated focus on those services where PBSA 
should be applied would outweigh the upfront administrative costs associated with base-
lining PBSA conversion activity.   
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4. SSP Should Develop a Program-wide, Multi-functional, Government-
only PBSA Team to Review Existing TES Services Statements of 
Work to Determine Potential PBSA Conversion Tasking   
 
 Review of historical SSP PBSA conversion attempts has indicated differences in 
the composition of PBSA teams and implementation approaches between individual SWS 
subsystem branches.  The spectrum of PBSA team composition ranged from a single 
individual directing conversion activity to a project engineer developing a predominantly 
engineering staffed team with intermittent supporting advisory staff.  There were no 
instances of a PBSA team comprised of a permanent multi-functional membership and no 
team was provided the broad discretion or authority to execute the conversion.  Similarly, 
the spectrum of implementation approaches ranged from the simple reallocation of 
hardware performance incentives to engineering services effort to detailed task review 
and targeted incentive development and application.  The factual record suggests that 
individual SWS subsystem branch leadership and organizational dynamics determine 
whether PBSA conversion is attempted and, if so, to what extent; branches differ in their 
understanding of what PBSA is and how it should be implemented; and intra-branch 
communication of PBSA conversion successes and failures is ineffective. 
 The existing environment is neither effective nor efficient in determining whether 
PBSA can work on SWS TES services.  A more practical approach would be to establish 
a program-wide, multi-functional, Government-only PBSA team to review existing TES 
services statements of work to determine potential PBSA conversion tasking.  The team 
would be comprised of senior-level front-line personnel including a project engineer from 
each SWS subsystem branch, an SWS system integration engineer, a logistics engineer, a 
contracting officer, a comptroller representative, and a lawyer; a senior management 
representative; and a fleet representative.  The team size should not exceed 12 members 
and membership should be diversified to include a mixture of civilian, military, 
headquarter, and field support representation.  The team should be provided decision-
making discretion and authority; develop a working charter; meet during regular duty 
hours at fixed intervals until the project is complete; and be materially rewarded based on 
a combination of the number of discrete tasks identified for conversion and implementing 
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methodologies developed.  This approach could be effective because (1) individual 
branch leadership and dynamics would not influence the decision-making process, (2) a 
core set of common TES services exists, (3) each individual branch contributes to system 
level performance, (4) historical branch-unique PBSA experience could be shared and 
leveraged upon, (5) differences in individual branch and associated Contractor program 
environment and business relationships could be evaluated, (6) a common team goal and 
set of objectives could be established and acted upon, and (7) the team would be properly 
incentivized to perform. 
 
5. SSP Should Team With Its Business Partners to Develop a Business 
Case That Determines Whether or Not PBSA Conversion of 
Individual TES Services Tasks Will Result in Operational Efficiencies 
and Program Cost Savings   
 
 The SWS program was founded and has been executed upon the concept of sole-
source, long-term business relationships with a family of contractors including, at its 
core, DoD giants such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General 
Dynamics.  These relationships have fostered an environment of Government/Industry 
teamwork; shared technical, program, and cost risk; and a higher than average profit 
margin for participating Contractors due to the inclusion of performance and schedule 
incentives into SWS subsystem contracts.  The overarching contracting strategy is 
founded on the premise that deployed systems have been fielded at high performance 
levels, the SWS fleet is highly trained and conditioned to rely on those performance 
levels, and historical CPFF LOE TES services contracts provide a flexible contract 
mechanism for the fleet, program management, and Contractors.  Under this philosophy 
SWS Contractors have been able to leverage their production contracts, where the profit 
margin is relatively high, off of the TES services contracts, which have historically 
provided a large reserve of funding to trouble-shoot and correct fleet problems, to 
virtually assure a high rate of return on its investment.  In this environment of declining 
budget the SWS Contractors are focused on maintaining their labor force and are 
reluctant to accept additional performance risk. 
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After the PBSA team has thoroughly evaluated TES service statements of work to 
define PBSA convertible tasks a business case will need to be developed to determine 
those tasks that could potentially result in operational efficiencies and/or program savings 
if converted.  SSP can benefit from inviting SWS Contractors to comment and contribute 
in the development of a thorough business analysis given the program culture.  SWS 
Contractors possess intimate detailed knowledge of the processes required to most 
effectively and efficiently perform TES services.  This key knowledge, as well as insight 
as to how Contractors internally measure an individual engineer’s performance, could 
significantly contribute to the development of a realistic business model.  Additionally, 
the Contractors should be more supportive of PBSA conversion attempts if they have 
been provided an opportunity to influence which tasks are selected.  
 
6. Selected SWS PBSA TES Services Should Be Contracted for Under a 
CPIF Completion Contracting Approach With an Aggressive Share 
Line and Targeted Performance Incentives Attached to Specific 
Process Related Problem Areas   
 
 After specific TES service tasks have been officially selected for PBSA 
conversion each SWS branch and Contractor will need to work together to establish a 
PBSA contract through the use of the PBSA model established in Chapter II, Section C of 
this thesis.  In summary each SWS branch and Contractor will need to establish a PBSA 
team to manage and administer the effort during the entire performance period, develop a 
contracting approach to isolate TES services PBSA activity in its omnibus contract, 
develop and provide effective surveillance and inspection and acceptance processes, 
resolve arising problems and conflict, and collect meaningful performance metrics.  
Although recommendation number five above should achieve Contractor buy-in to the 
TES services PBSA conversion effort additional incentive may be required to motivate 
performance success.   
PBSA implementation experience to date has established that SWS Contractors 
have historically had little incentive to agree to changes in the current program and 
contracting arrangements.  The current philosophy of allocating overarching hardware 
performance incentives to CPIF LOE TES services with steep share lines (i.e. 90/10 and 
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80/20) does not promote operational efficiencies and cost control.  Contractors are 
motivated to retain staff and can easily attain hardware performance levels.  The use of a 
CPIF completion contracting approach with an aggressive share line (no higher than a 
50% Government share) and targeted performance incentives attached to specific process 
related problem areas would best suit the program and business issues associated with 
selected SWS PBSA TES services.  This CPIF completion contract type would shift 
performance and cost risk more clearly to the Contractor but still provides the Contractor 
with more protection than a fixed price approach.  The aggressive share line will 
incentivize the Contractor to consider the cost of process improvements.  The targeted 
performance incentives would motivate the Contractor to concentrate on solving process 
related issues.  In summary a completion requirement with a balanced, multiple incentive 
approach would (1) emphasize task delivery, (2) allow the Contractor to make 
cost/performance trade-offs that are in the interest of both parties, and (3) may enhance 
the chances for successful TES service PBSA implementation and performance. 
 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1. Primary Research Question 
 
a. Should the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Apply the 
Concepts of PBSA to Strategic Weapons Systems (SWS) 
Technical Engineering Support (TES) Services? 
 
  SSP should apply the concepts of PBSA to selected SWS TES services.  
SSP should undergo an organized and comprehensive review of TES services tasking by 
SWS subsystem and at the system level using available PBSA procedures and 
methodologies.  Candidate tasks should be selected only if the PBSA conversion would 
result in acceptable programmatic and technical risk, operational efficiency, and 
projected cost savings.  The following answers to the secondary questions of this thesis 
will provide supporting rationale for the primary research question answer.      
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
 
a. What Is PBSA and What Are the Overarching Department of 
Defense (DoD) and Department of Navy (DON) PBSA Policy 
Objectives? 
 
Performance-based contracting is the structuring of all aspects of an 
acquisition around the purpose of the work to be performed as opposed to either the 
manner by which the work is to be performed or broad and imprecise statements of 
Work.  FAR Subpart 37.6 sets forth that performance-based contracts should (1) describe 
the requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of performance of 
the work, (2) use measurable performance standards (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, 
quantity, etc.) and quality assurance surveillance plans (see 46.103(a) and 46.401(a)), (3) 
Specify procedures for reductions of fee or for reductions to the price of a fixed-price 
contract when services are not performed or do not meet contract requirements (see 
46.407), and (4) include performance incentives where appropriate.  This thesis details a 
PBSA model composed of five key activities including establishment of a multifunctional 
team, market research, requirements generation, source selection, and contract 
performance.  Establishment of a multifunctional team is an essential first step for 
successfully executing a PBSA and discussion revolved around team membership and 
management.  The market research and source selection activities are generally consistent 
with other type of federal acquisitions and discussion leveraged upon existing federal 
regulation.  Discussion of the requirements generation activity presented two alternative 
approaches including the PWS and SOO and provided insight as to the importance of 
establishing a QAP.  A PWS generally includes the development of a job analysis, 
performance objectives, performance standards, acceptable quality levels, and a 
performance requirements summary.  The SOO is a much different requirements 
approach in that the Government provides the Contractor with a set of high-level 
performance objectives and allows the Contractor to propose a detailed performance plan.  
Key elements of the contract performance activity include service delivery, surveillance, 
contract administration, conflict resolution, and performance measurement. 
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Evolutionary PBSA policy foundation and implementation guidance, 
beginning with OFPP P.L. 91-2 dated 9 April 1991, supports that the Government is 
becoming increasingly focused on improving the efficiency of service acquisitions 
through the use of PBSA.  The existing overarching DoD policy is that, at a minimum, 50 
percent of service acquisitions, measured both in dollars and actions, are to be 
performance-based by the year 2005.  DoD implementing guidance is provided in the 
“Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA) in the Department of 
Defense (DOD)” issued by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology in December 2000.  DON’s policy is provided in the “DON Performance 
Based Service Acquisition Implementation Plan” dated June 2000.  ASN(RD&A) has 
been established as the focal point for implementing DON PBSA guidance and criteria to 
all functional areas of the DON acquisition community.  The DON implementation plan 
stipulates that (1) a DON contract can be categorized as PBSA if at least 80% of its dollar 
value met the criteria of FAR 37.6 to be categorized as PBSA, (2) standard commercial 
services may be considered PBSA, and (3) the plan applies to service requirements 
exceeding the DD 350 reporting threshold of $25,000.   The implementation plan 
identifies the service contract categories to which PBSA applies maintenance, overhaul, 
repair, service, rehabilitation, salvage, modernization or modification of supplies, systems 
or equipment; maintenance of real property; base operations and support contracts; 
operation of Government-owned equipment, facilities and systems; education and 
training; medical services; program management support; and Research and 
Development (less basic and applied research).   HCAs must provide PBSA metrics 
including the total service contract awards, total PBSA contract awards, and PBSA 
compliance rate by estimated dollars and numbers of actions in order to assess DON 
PBSA implementation effectiveness.   
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b. What Are Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) TES 
Services?  
 
 DoD acquisition programs are categorized by ACAT designation 
including ACATs I (various), II, III, and IV.  The ACAT designation of a program 
determines the level of oversight for key milestones within the program’s development, 
production, testing and deployment.  Major systems receive ACATs I (various) and II 
designations.  ACAT I programs are further defined as MDAPs, designated as ID or IC, 
or MAISAPs, designated as IAM or IAC.  MDAPs are designated by the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).  A program is 
considered an MDAP if its projected development effort exceeds $365 million or its 
projected procurement effort exceeds $2.19 billion in FY 2000 constant dollars.  There 
are currently 10 ACAT ID and 16 ACAT IC MDAPs within the DON.  MDAPs are 
conceived, managed, reviewed, and approved through the Defense Acquisition 
Management Framework contained within the new DoD 5000.2 instruction approved on 
12 May 2003.  The Defense Acquisition Management Framework details an overarching 
program acquisition cycle that includes three milestone decision points (A, B, and C) and 
five distinct progression phases including CR, TD, SDD, PD, and OS with each distinct 
phase containing service acquisition efforts.  This thesis focuses on specific engineering 
service effort within the OS phase relating to the operational sustainment and upgrade of 
deployed systems.   
 SSP’s SWS program is an MDAP with the predominant portion of its TES 
services residing in the OS phase.  The SWS program includes 29 general TES services 
as follows: Accuracy Evaluation and Maintenance Support; Analysis and Evaluations of 
Patrol Data; Computer Resources Support; Configuration Management Support; Contract 
Data Management Support; FCET and DASO Support; Fleet Documentation Support; 
Life Cycle Management Support; Logistics Support; Maintainability and Maintenance 
Support; Obsolescence Management Support; On/Off-Site Field Engineering Support; 
Performance Evaluation Support; Problem Identification, Investigation, and Solution; 
Program Management Support; Quality Assurance and Surveillance Support; Reliability 
Support; Repairs Support; Safety Program Support; Software Development and 
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Maintenance Support; SPALT Technical Assistance; Subsystem-unique equipment 
support; SWFLANT and SWFPAC Support; Systems Evaluations and Design Technical 
Assistance; Support Planning Assistance; Test Equipment Support; Test Facility 
Operation and Maintenance; TFR Analysis and CARs Support; and Training Support.  
Detailed differences between the levels and types of support for each TES service task 
exist between Contractors and subsystems.  The breadth of engineering disciplines 
involved in supporting these efforts include design, systems, software, electrical, 
manufacturing, mechanical, industrial, materials, component, test, field, quality, and 
logistics engineers. 
 
c. What Has Been SSP’s Experience With TES Services PBSA 
Acquisition Strategies?  
 
SSP has implemented overarching and targeted incentive structures on 
TES services contracts under CPIF LOE, FPI completion, and CPIF completion 
contracting instruments.  An overarching performance incentive is an incentive that is 
associated with key hardware performance parameters but is applied against TES 
services.  A targeted performance incentive is an incentive that is associated with a 
particular TES services element.  Overarching system level performance incentives have 
been applied to CPIF LOE SWS subsystems TES service related Contract Line Item 
Numbers (CLINs) since the late 1980s starting with the missile subsystem contract and 
more recently with the navigation and fire control subsystems contracts.  The conversion 
from a CPFF LOE to CPIF LOE contract structure did not materially affect the 
negotiation and contract development processes.  The approach has been successful for 
both the Government and Contractors as follows: (1) a skilled labor force has been 
retained despite the industry-wide boom and bust of the 1990s and early 2000s, (2) 
adequate cost growth notification and control has been maintained; (3) little additional 
administrative effort has occurred; (4) excellent sustained system level performance has 
been maintained; (5) Contractors have received a high rate of return on investment for 
low risk effort, (6) a stable minimum volume of long-term work has been virtually 
assured; and (7) the quality of the delivered service remained unchanged.  
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The FY 99 SWS navigation subsystem TES services effort was contracted 
for under a FPI contract type with overarching performance incentives.  Although the 
parties were able to agree on the contracting approach and implementing language during 
the negotiation process the actual performance results were unsuccessful due to 
interpretive problems on both sides of the business relationship.  The TES services effort 
overran by approximately five percent resulting in extraordinary upper-level management 
attention by both parties due to increased program friction, significantly increased 
program and administrative involvement by the Contracting Officer, and the virtual 
impossibility of determining whether a deliverable met the intended quality standard.  
The experienced contract and performance management problems resulted in 
reassessment of the contracting approach, eventually resulting in the implementation of a 
CPIF LOE contracting philosophy with overarching performance incentives beginning in 
FY 00 and for all subsequent SWS navigation subsystem effort. 
The FY 01 SWS launcher subsystem TES services were contracted for 
under a CPIF completion contract type with overarching performance incentives.  The 
contract language development approach differed substantially from that used in the FPI 
effort and provided significantly more flexibility.  The actual performance results of this 
flexible approach were more successful than the FPI approach as the Government was 
provided more cost and performance control and the Contractor was provided a higher 
return on their investment and improved programmatic response.  However, weaknesses 
still existed in determining whether a deliverable met the intended quality standard.  The 
CPIF completion approach with overarching performance incentives has become the 
accepted contracting approach for the SWS launcher subsystem TES services effort. 
The SWS launcher subsystem participants attempted to convert the entire 
FY 03 deployed systems support effort ($31M of planned budget), including TES 
services and other efforts, to a performance-based targeted incentive service contract.  
The implementation process generally followed the PBSA implementation presented in 
Chapter II, Section C of this thesis.  After a complete analysis had been performed and 
significant administrative costs had been incurred the parties agreed to attempt a PBSA 
conversion of logistics provisioning only ($800K of the originally planned $31M budget) 
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with only part of the effort finally converted.  Performance results of the converted PBSA 
effort have not been fully assessed.  Preliminary indications are that the Government is 
moderately uncomfortable about the change in process control while the Contractor 
claims that the only efficiency savings that have occurred are those associated with the 
reduction of Government oversight.  The disappointing results were that significant 
resources and administrative costs were incurred, less than two percent of the target effort 
was converted, participants were frustrated and would likely not volunteer for future 
attempts, and both Government and Contractor management ultimately balked at 
accepting any perceived additional risk. 
 
d. What Are the Significant Factors That Have Facilitated or 
Hindered SWS TES Services PBSA Implementation? 
 
The SWS program was founded and has been executed upon the concept 
of sole-source, long-term business relationships with a family of contractors including, at 
its core, DoD giants such as Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Boeing, and General 
Dynamics.  These relationships have fostered an environment of Government/Industry 
teamwork; shared technical, program, and cost risk; and a higher than average profit 
margin for participating Contractors due to the inclusion of performance and schedule 
incentives into SWS subsystem contracts.  The overarching contracting strategy is 
founded on the premise that deployed systems have been fielded at high performance 
levels, the SWS fleet is highly trained and conditioned to rely on those performance 
levels, and historical CPFF LOE TES services contracts provide a flexible contract 
mechanism for the fleet, program management, and Contractors.  Under this philosophy 
SWS Contractors have been able to leverage their production contracts, where the profit 
margin is relatively high, off of the TES services contracts, which have historically 
provided a large reserve of funding to trouble-shoot and correct fleet problems, to 
virtually assure a high rate of return on its investment.  PBSA negatively affects this 
program relationship in that the SWS Contractors perceive a fundamental program shift 
away from partnership and shared risk and SSP perceives a loss of program control.  
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The current philosophy of allocating overarching hardware performance 
incentives to CPIF LOE TES services with steep share lines (i.e. 90/10 and 80/20) does 
not promote operational efficiencies and cost control.  PBSA implementation experience 
to date has established that SWS subsystem branches and their Contractors have 
historically had little incentive to agree to changes in the current program and contracting 
arrangements.  SSP SWS subsystem branches are happy with Contractor performance 
and have little motivation to incur the potentially increased performance risk resulting 
from further staff reductions and shift of process control.  SWS Contractors are focused 
on maintaining their labor force, can easily attain hardware performance levels, and are 
reluctant to accept additional performance risk. 
Review of historical SSP PBSA conversion attempts has indicated 
differences in the composition of PBSA teams and implementation approaches between 
individual SWS subsystem branches.  The spectrum of PBSA team composition ranged 
from a single individual directing conversion activity to a project engineer developing a 
predominantly engineering staffed team with intermittent supporting advisory staff.  
There were no instances of a PBSA team comprised of a permanent multi-functional 
membership and no team was provided the broad discretion or authority to execute the 
conversion.  Similarly, the spectrum of implementation approaches ranged from the 
simple reallocation of hardware performance incentives to engineering services effort to 
detailed task review and targeted incentive development and application.  The factual 
record suggests that individual SWS subsystem branch leadership and organizational 
dynamics determine whether PBSA conversion is attempted and, if so, to what extent; 
branches differ in their understanding of what PBSA is and how it should be 
implemented; and intra-branch communication of PBSA conversion successes and 
failures is ineffective.  The existing environment is neither effective nor efficient in 
determining whether PBSA can work on SWS TES services.   
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e. How Might SSP Apply PBSA Best Practices and Risk Mitigation 
Strategies During the Acquisition of SWS TES Services? 
 
SSP should develop a program-wide, multi-functional, Government-only 
PBSA team to review existing TES services statements of work to determine potential 
PBSA conversion tasking.  The team would be comprised of senior-level front-line 
personnel including a project engineer from each SWS subsystem branch, an SWS 
system integration engineer, a logistics engineer, a contracting officer, a budget analyst, 
an accountant, and a lawyer; a senior management representative; and a fleet 
representative.  The team size should not exceed 12 members and should be diversified to 
include a mixture of civilian, military, headquarter, and field support representation.  The 
team would be provided decision-making discretion and authority; develop a working 
charter; meet during regular duty hours at fixed intervals until the project is complete; 
and be materially rewarded based on a combination of the number of discrete tasks 
identified and conversion methodologies developed.   This approach would be effective 
for the following reasons: (1) individual branch leadership and dynamics would not 
influence the decision-making process, (2) a core set of common TES services exists, (3) 
each individual branch contributes to system level performance, (4) historical branch-
unique PBSA experience could be shared and leveraged upon, (5) differences in 
individual branch and associated Contractor program environment and business 
relationships could be evaluated, (6) a common team goal and set of objectives could be 
established and  acted upon, and (7) the team would be properly incentivized to perform. 
SSP should team with its business partners to develop a business case that 
determines whether or not PBSA conversion of individual TES services tasks will result 
in operational efficiencies and program cost savings.   SSP can benefit from inviting 
SWS Contractors to comment and contribute in the development of a thorough business 
analysis given the program culture.  SWS Contractors possess intimate detailed 
knowledge of the processes required to most effectively and efficiently perform TES 
services.  This key knowledge, as well as insight as to how Contractors internally 
measure an individual engineer’s performance, could significantly contribute to the 
development of a realistic business model.  Additionally, the Contractors should be more 
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supportive of PBSA conversion attempts if they have been provided an opportunity to 
influence which tasks are selected.  
Selected SWS PBSA TES services should be contracted for under a CPIF 
completion contracting approach with an aggressive share line and targeted performance 
incentives attached to specific process related problem areas.  After specific TES service 
tasks have been officially selected for PBSA conversion each SWS branch and 
Contractor will need to work together to establish a PBSA contract through the use of the 
PBSA model established in Chapter II, Section C of this thesis.  In summary each SWS 
branch and Contractor will need to establish a PBSA team to manage and administer the 
effort during the entire performance period, develop a contracting approach to isolate 
TES services PBSA activity in its omnibus contract, develop and provide effective 
surveillance and inspection and acceptance processes, resolve arising problems and 
conflict, and collect meaningful performance metrics.  The use of a CPIF completion 
contracting approach with an aggressive share line (no higher than a 50% Government 
share) and targeted performance incentives attached to specific process related problem 
areas would best suit the program and business issues associated with selected SWS 
PBSA TES services.  This CPIF completion contract type would shift performance and 
cost risk more clearly to the Contractor but still provides the Contractor with more 
protection than a fixed price approach.  The aggressive share line will incentivize the 
Contractor to consider the cost of process improvements.  The targeted performance 
incentives would motivate the Contractor to concentrate on solving process related issues.  
In summary a completion requirement with a balanced, multiple incentive approach 
would (1) emphasize task delivery, (2) allow the Contractor to make cost/performance 
trade-offs that are in the interest of both parties, and (3) may enhance the chances for 
successful TES service PBSA implementation and performance. 
 
E. SUGGESTED AREA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
A core ingredient to successful PBSA implementation is the establishment of 
performance standards and associated AQLs and the ability to measure performance. 
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Such information is not readily available or intuitive for complex engineering services.  
The development of general industry-wide engineering performance standards may 
greatly enhance PBSA success.  Follow-on research could focus on surveying 
Government activities and private sector firms to determine how engineering effort is 
measured, evaluated, and rewarded.  The survey could be setup to evaluate differing 
experience levels, educational and training foundations, complexities of assigned tasks, 
corporate and/or program cultures, and engineering employee incentive structures.   
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